sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) NNNNAAAAMMMMEEEE sudo - execute a command as another user SSSSYYYYNNNNOOOOPPPPSSSSIIIISSSS ssssuuuuddddoooo ----VVVV | ----hhhh | ----llll | ----LLLL | ----vvvv | ----kkkk | ----KKKK | ----ssss | [ ----HHHH ] [----PPPP ] [----SSSS ] [ ----bbbb ] | [ ----pppp _p_r_o_m_p_t ] [ ----cccc _c_l_a_s_s|_- ] [ ----aaaa _a_u_t_h___t_y_p_e ] [ ----uuuu _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e|_#_u_i_d ] _c_o_m_m_a_n_d DDDDEEEESSSSCCCCRRRRIIIIPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNN ssssuuuuddddoooo allows a permitted user to execute a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d as the superuser or another user, as specified in the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s file. The real and effective uid and gid are set to match those of the target user as specified in the passwd file (the group vector is also initialized when the target user is not root). By default, ssssuuuuddddoooo requires that users authenticate themselves with a password (NOTE: by default this is the user's password, not the root password). Once a user has been authenticated, a timestamp is updated and the user may then use sudo without a password for a short period of time (5 minutes unless overridden in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s). ssssuuuuddddoooo determines who is an authorized user by consulting the file _/_e_t_c_/_s_u_d_o_e_r_s. By giving ssssuuuuddddoooo the ----vvvv flag a user can update the time stamp without running a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d_. The password prompt itself will also time out if the user's password is not entered within 5 minutes (unless overrid­ den via _s_u_d_o_e_r_s). If a user who is not listed in the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s file tries to run a command via ssssuuuuddddoooo, mail is sent to the proper author­ ities, as defined at configure time or the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s file (defaults to root). Note that the mail will not be sent if an unauthorized user tries to run sudo with the ----llll or ----vvvv flags. This allows users to determine for themselves whether or not they are allowed to use ssssuuuuddddoooo. ssssuuuuddddoooo can log both successful and unsuccessful attempts (as well as errors) to _s_y_s_l_o_g(3), a log file, or both. By default ssssuuuuddddoooo will log via _s_y_s_l_o_g(3) but this is changeable at configure time or via the _s_u_d_o_e_r_s file. OOOOPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNNSSSS ssssuuuuddddoooo accepts the following command line options: -V The ----VVVV (_v_e_r_s_i_o_n) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to print the ver­ sion number and exit. If the invoking user is already root the ----VVVV option will print out a list of the defaults ssssuuuuddddoooo was compiled with as well as the machine's local network addresses. -l The ----llll (_l_i_s_t) option will list out the allowed (and forbidden) commands for the user on the current host. April 25, 2002 1.6.6 1 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) -L The ----LLLL (_l_i_s_t defaults) option will list out the param­ eters that may be set in a _D_e_f_a_u_l_t_s line along with a short description for each. This option is useful in conjunction with _g_r_e_p(1). -h The ----hhhh (_h_e_l_p) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to print a usage mes­ sage and exit. -v If given the ----vvvv (_v_a_l_i_d_a_t_e) option, ssssuuuuddddoooo will update the user's timestamp, prompting for the user's pass­ word if necessary. This extends the ssssuuuuddddoooo timeout for another 5 minutes (or whatever the timeout is set to in _s_u_d_o_e_r_s) but does not run a command. -k The ----kkkk (_k_i_l_l) option to ssssuuuuddddoooo invalidates the user's timestamp by setting the time on it to the epoch. The next time ssssuuuuddddoooo is run a password will be required. This option does not require a password and was added to allow a user to revoke ssssuuuuddddoooo permissions from a .logout file. -K The ----KKKK (sure _k_i_l_l) option to ssssuuuuddddoooo removes the user's timestamp entirely. Likewise, this option does not require a password. -b The ----bbbb (_b_a_c_k_g_r_o_u_n_d) option tells ssssuuuuddddoooo to run the given command in the background. Note that if you use the ----bbbb option you cannot use shell job control to manipu­ late the process. -p The ----pppp (_p_r_o_m_p_t) option allows you to override the default password prompt and use a custom one. If the password prompt contains the %u escape, %u will be replaced with the user's login name. Similarly, %h will be replaced with the local hostname. -c The ----cccc (_c_l_a_s_s) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to run the specified command with resources limited by the specified login class. The _c_l_a_s_s argument can be either a class name as defined in /etc/login.conf, or a single '-' charac­ ter. Specifying a _c_l_a_s_s of - indicates that the com­ mand should be run restricted by the default login capabilities for the user the command is run as. If the _c_l_a_s_s argument specifies an existing user class, the command must be run as root, or the ssssuuuuddddoooo command must be run from a shell that is already root. This option is only available on systems with BSD login classes where ssssuuuuddddoooo has been configured with the --with-logincap option. -a The ----aaaa (_a_u_t_h_e_n_t_i_c_a_t_i_o_n _t_y_p_e) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to use the specified authentication type when validating the user, as allowed by /etc/login.conf. The system administrator may specify a list of sudo-specific April 25, 2002 1.6.6 2 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) authentication methods by adding an "auth-sudo" entry in /etc/login.conf. This option is only available on systems that support BSD authentication where ssssuuuuddddoooo has been configured with the --with-bsdauth option. -u The ----uuuu (_u_s_e_r) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to run the specified command as a user other than _r_o_o_t. To specify a _u_i_d instead of a _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e, use _#_u_i_d. -s The ----ssss (_s_h_e_l_l) option runs the shell specified by the _S_H_E_L_L environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in _p_a_s_s_w_d(4). -H The ----HHHH (_H_O_M_E) option sets the HOME environment vari­ able to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as specified in _p_a_s_s_w_d(4). By default, ssssuuuuddddoooo does not modify HOME. -P The ----PPPP (_p_r_e_s_e_r_v_e _g_r_o_u_p _v_e_c_t_o_r) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to preserve the user's group vector unaltered. By default, ssssuuuuddddoooo will initialize the group vector to the list of groups the target user is in. The real and effective group IDs, however, are still set to match the target user. -S The ----SSSS (_s_t_d_i_n) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to read the password from standard input instead of the terminal device. -- The -------- flag indicates that ssssuuuuddddoooo should stop processing command line arguments. It is most useful in conjunc­ tion with the ----ssss flag. RRRREEEETTTTUUUURRRRNNNN VVVVAAAALLLLUUUUEEEESSSS Upon successful execution of a program, the return value from ssssuuuuddddoooo will simply be the return value of the program that was executed. Otherwise, ssssuuuuddddoooo quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a configuration/permission problem or if ssssuuuuddddoooo cannot exe­ cute the given command. In the latter case the error string is printed to stderr. If ssssuuuuddddoooo cannot _s_t_a_t(2) one or more entries in the user's PATH an error is printed on stderr. (If the directory does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This should not happen under normal circum­ stances. The most common reason for _s_t_a_t(2) to return "permission denied" is if you are running an automounter and one of the directories in your PATH is on a machine that is currently unreachable. SSSSEEEECCCCUUUURRRRIIIITTTTYYYY NNNNOOOOTTTTEEEESSSS ssssuuuuddddoooo tries to be safe when executing external commands. Variables that control how dynamic loading and binding is done can be used to subvert the program that ssssuuuuddddoooo runs. April 25, 2002 1.6.6 3 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) To combat this the LD_*, _RLD_*, SHLIB_PATH (HP-UX only), and LIBPATH (AIX only) environment variables are removed from the environment passed on to all commands executed. ssssuuuuddddoooo will also remove the IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV, KRB_CONF, KRBCONFDIR, KRBTKFILE, KRB5_CONFIG, LOCALDOMAIN, RES_OPTIONS, HOSTALIASES, NLSPATH, PATH_LOCALE, TERMINFO, TERMINFO_DIRS and TERMPATH variables as they too can pose a threat. If the TERMCAP variable is set and is a path­ name, it too is ignored. Additionally, if the LC_* or LANGUAGE variables contain the / or % characters, they are ignored. If ssssuuuuddddoooo has been compiled with SecurID support, the VAR_ACE, USR_ACE and DLC_ACE variables are cleared as well. The list of environment variables that ssssuuuuddddoooo clears is contained in the output of sudo -V when run as root. To prevent command spoofing, ssssuuuuddddoooo checks "." and "" (both denoting current directory) last when searching for a com­ mand in the user's PATH (if one or both are in the PATH). Note, however, that the actual PATH environment variable is _n_o_t modified and is passed unchanged to the program that ssssuuuuddddoooo executes. For security reasons, if your OS supports shared libraries and does not disable user-defined library search paths for setuid programs (most do), you should either use a linker option that disables this behavior or link ssssuuuuddddoooo stati­ cally. ssssuuuuddddoooo will check the ownership of its timestamp directory (_/_v_a_r_/_r_u_n_/_s_u_d_o by default) and ignore the directory's con­ tents if it is not owned by root and only writable by root. On systems that allow non-root users to give away files via _c_h_o_w_n(2), if the timestamp directory is located in a directory writable by anyone (e.g.: _/_t_m_p), it is pos­ sible for a user to create the timestamp directory before ssssuuuuddddoooo is run. However, because ssssuuuuddddoooo checks the ownership and mode of the directory and its contents, the only dam­ age that can be done is to "hide" files by putting them in the timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is owned by root and inaccessible by any other user the user placing files there would be unable to get them back out. To get around this issue you can use a directory that is not world-writable for the timestamps (_/_v_a_r_/_a_d_m_/_s_u_d_o for instance) or create _/_v_a_r_/_r_u_n_/_s_u_d_o with the appropriate owner (root) and permissions (0700) in the system startup files. ssssuuuuddddoooo will not honor timestamps set far in the future. Timestamps with a date greater than current_time + 2 * TIMEOUT will be ignored and sudo will log and complain. This is done to keep a user from creating his/her own timestamp with a bogus date on systems that allow users to give away files. April 25, 2002 1.6.6 4 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) Please note that ssssuuuuddddoooo will only log the command it explic­ itly runs. If a user runs a command such as sudo su or sudo sh, subsequent commands run from that shell will _n_o_t be logged, nor will ssssuuuuddddoooo's access control affect them. The same is true for commands that offer shell escapes (including most editors). Because of this, care must be taken when giving users access to commands via ssssuuuuddddoooo to verify that the command does not inadvertantly give the user an effective root shell. EEEEXXXXAAAAMMMMPPPPLLLLEEEESSSS Note: the following examples assume suitable _s_u_d_o_e_r_s(4) entries. To get a file listing of an unreadable directory: % sudo ls /usr/local/protected To list the home directory of user yazza on a machine where the filesystem holding ~yazza is not exported as root: % sudo -u yazza ls ~yazza To edit the _i_n_d_e_x_._h_t_m_l file as user www: % sudo -u www vi ~www/htdocs/index.html To shutdown a machine: % sudo shutdown -r +15 "quick reboot" To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition. Note that this runs the commands in a sub- shell to make the cd and file redirection work. % sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE" EEEENNNNVVVVIIIIRRRROOOONNNNMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT ssssuuuuddddoooo utilizes the following environment variables: April 25, 2002 1.6.6 5 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) PATH Set to a sane value if SECURE_PATH is set SHELL Used to determine shell to run with -s option USER Set to the target user (root unless the -u option is specified) HOME In -s or -H mode (or if sudo was configured with the --enable-shell-sets-home option), set to homedir of the target user. SUDO_PROMPT Used as the default password prompt SUDO_COMMAND Set to the command run by sudo SUDO_USER Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo SUDO_UID Set to the uid of the user who invoked sudo SUDO_GID Set to the gid of the user who invoked sudo SUDO_PS1 If set, PS1 will be set to its value FFFFIIIILLLLEEEESSSS /etc/sudoers List of who can run what /var/run/sudo Directory containing timestamps AAAAUUUUTTTTHHHHOOOORRRRSSSS Many people have worked on ssssuuuuddddoooo over the years; this ver­ sion consists of code written primarily by: Todd Miller Chris Jepeway See the HISTORY file in the ssssuuuuddddoooo distribution or visit http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/history.html for a short history of ssssuuuuddddoooo. BBBBUUUUGGGGSSSS If you feel you have found a bug in sudo, please submit a bug report at http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/bugs/ DDDDIIIISSSSCCCCLLLLAAAAIIIIMMMMEEEERRRR SSSSuuuuddddoooo is provided ``AS IS'' and any express or implied war­ ranties, including, but not limited to, the implied war­ ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. See the LICENSE file distributed with ssssuuuuddddoooo for complete details. CCCCAAAAVVVVEEEEAAAATTTTSSSS There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if that user has access to commands allowing shell escapes. If users have sudo ALL there is nothing to prevent them from creating their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!' elements in the user specifi­ cation. Running shell scripts via ssssuuuuddddoooo can expose the same kernel bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some April 25, 2002 1.6.6 6 sudo(1m) MAINTENANCE COMMANDS sudo(1m) operating systems (if your OS supports the /dev/fd/ direc­ tory, setuid shell scripts are generally safe). SSSSEEEEEEEE AAAALLLLSSSSOOOO _s_t_a_t(2), _l_o_g_i_n___c_a_p(3), _s_u_d_o_e_r_s(4), _p_a_s_s_w_d(5), _v_i_s_u_d_o(1m), _g_r_e_p(1), _s_u(1). April 25, 2002 1.6.6 7