/*++ /* NAME /* tls_verify 3 /* SUMMARY /* peer name and peer certificate verification /* SYNOPSIS /* #define TLS_INTERNAL /* #include <tls.h> /* /* int tls_verify_certificate_callback(ok, ctx) /* int ok; /* X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; /* /* int tls_log_verify_error(TLScontext) /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* char *tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext) /* X509 *peercert; /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* char *tls_issuer_CN(peercert, TLScontext) /* X509 *peercert; /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* /* const char *tls_dns_name(gn, TLScontext) /* const GENERAL_NAME *gn; /* TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* DESCRIPTION /* tls_verify_certificate_callback() is called several times (directly /* or indirectly) from crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It collects errors /* and trust information at each element of the trust chain. /* The last call at depth 0 sets the verification status based /* on the cumulative winner (lowest depth) of errors vs. trust. /* We always return 1 (continue the handshake) and handle trust /* and peer-name verification problems at the application level. /* /* tls_log_verify_error() (called only when we care about the /* peer certificate, that is not when opportunistic) logs the /* reason why the certificate failed to be verified. /* /* tls_peer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer /* certificate subject, or an empty string if no CommonName was /* found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be /* freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable /* ASCII characters. /* /* tls_issuer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer /* certificate issuer, or an empty string if no CommonName was /* found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be /* freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable /* ASCII characters. /* /* tls_dns_name() returns the string value of a GENERAL_NAME /* from a DNS subjectAltName extension. If non-printable characters /* are found, a null string is returned instead. Further sanity /* checks may be added if the need arises. /* /* Arguments: /* .IP ok /* Result of prior verification: non-zero means success. In /* order to reduce the noise level, some tests or error reports /* are disabled when verification failed because of some /* earlier problem. /* .IP ctx /* SSL application context. This links to the Postfix TLScontext /* with enforcement and logging options. /* .IP gn /* An OpenSSL GENERAL_NAME structure holding a DNS subjectAltName /* to be decoded and checked for validity. /* .IP peercert /* Server or client X.509 certificate. /* .IP TLScontext /* Server or client context for warning messages. /* DIAGNOSTICS /* tls_peer_CN(), tls_issuer_CN() and tls_dns_name() log a warning /* when 1) the requested information is not available in the specified /* certificate, 2) the result exceeds a fixed limit, 3) the result /* contains NUL characters or the result contains non-printable or /* non-ASCII characters. /* LICENSE /* .ad /* .fi /* This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want. /* The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge /* the use of his software. /* AUTHOR(S) /* Originally written by: /* Lutz Jaenicke /* BTU Cottbus /* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik /* Universitaetsplatz 3-4 /* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany /* /* Updated by: /* Wietse Venema /* IBM T.J. Watson Research /* P.O. Box 704 /* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA /* /* Victor Duchovni /* Morgan Stanley /*--*/ /* System library. */ #include <sys_defs.h> #include <ctype.h> #ifdef USE_TLS #include <string.h> /* Utility library. */ #include <msg.h> #include <mymalloc.h> #include <stringops.h> /* TLS library. */ #define TLS_INTERNAL #include <tls.h> /* update_error_state - safely stash away error state */ static void update_error_state(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int depth, X509 *errorcert, int errorcode) { /* No news is good news */ if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0 && TLScontext->errordepth <= depth) return; /* * The certificate pointer is stable during the verification callback, * but may be freed after the callback returns. Since we delay error * reporting till later, we bump the refcount so we can rely on it still * being there until later. */ if (TLScontext->errorcert != 0) X509_free(TLScontext->errorcert); if (errorcert != 0) X509_up_ref(errorcert); TLScontext->errorcert = errorcert; TLScontext->errorcode = errorcode; TLScontext->errordepth = depth; } /* tls_verify_certificate_callback - verify peer certificate info */ int tls_verify_certificate_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ]; X509 *cert; int err; int depth; int max_depth; SSL *con; TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; /* May be NULL as of OpenSSL 1.0, thanks for the API change! */ cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); /* Don't log the internal root CA unless there's an unexpected error. */ if (ok && TLScontext->tadepth > 0 && depth > TLScontext->tadepth) return (1); /* * Certificate chain depth limit violations are mis-reported by the * OpenSSL library, from SSL_CTX_set_verify(3): * * The certificate verification depth set with SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth() * stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced * will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected. * * We set a limit that is one higher than the user requested limit. If this * higher limit is reached, we raise an error even a trusted root CA is * present at this depth. This disambiguates trust chain truncation from * an incomplete trust chain. */ max_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con) - 1; /* * We never terminate the SSL handshake in the verification callback, * rather we allow the TLS handshake to continue, but mark the session as * unverified. The application is responsible for closing any sessions * with unverified credentials. */ if (max_depth >= 0 && depth > max_depth) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); ok = 0; } if (ok == 0) update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err); if (TLScontext->log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) { if (cert) X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); else strcpy(buf, "<unknown>"); msg_info("%s: depth=%d verify=%d subject=%s", TLScontext->namaddr, depth, ok, printable(buf, '?')); } return (1); } /* tls_log_verify_error - Report final verification error status */ void tls_log_verify_error(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { char buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ]; int err = TLScontext->errorcode; X509 *cert = TLScontext->errorcert; int depth = TLScontext->errordepth; #define PURPOSE ((depth>0) ? "CA": TLScontext->am_server ? "client": "server") if (err == X509_V_OK) return; /* * Specific causes for verification failure. */ switch (err) { case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: /* * We expect the error cert to be the leaf, but it is likely * sufficient to omit it from the log, even less user confusion. */ msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: " "not trusted by local or TLSA policy", TLScontext->namaddr); break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: " "self-signed certificate", TLScontext->namaddr); break; case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: /* * There is no difference between issuing cert not provided and * provided, but not found in CAfile/CApath. Either way, we don't * trust it. */ if (cert) X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf)); else strcpy(buf, "<unknown>"); msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: untrusted issuer %s", TLScontext->namaddr, printable(buf, '?')); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate not" " yet valid", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate has" " expired", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr); break; case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: not designated for " "use as a %s certificate", TLScontext->namaddr, PURPOSE); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: " "certificate chain longer than limit(%d)", TLScontext->namaddr, depth - 1); break; default: msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: num=%d:%s", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr, err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); break; } } #ifndef DONT_GRIPE #define DONT_GRIPE 0 #define DO_GRIPE 1 #endif /* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */ static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid, const char *label, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int gripe) { const char *myname = "tls_text_name"; int pos; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; ASN1_STRING *entry_str; int asn1_type; int utf8_length; unsigned char *utf8_value; int ch; unsigned char *cp; if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) { if (gripe != DONT_GRIPE) { msg_warn("%s: %s: peer certificate has no %s", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); tls_print_errors(); } return (0); } #if 0 /* * If the match is required unambiguous, insist that that no other values * be present. */ if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, pos) >= 0) { msg_warn("%s: %s: multiple %ss in peer certificate", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); return (0); } #endif if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos)) == 0) { /* This should not happen */ msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s entry", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); tls_print_errors(); return (0); } if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) { /* This should not happen */ msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s data", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); tls_print_errors(); return (0); } /* * XXX Convert everything into UTF-8. This is a super-set of ASCII, so we * don't have to bother with separate code paths for ASCII-like content. * If the payload is ASCII then we won't waste lots of CPU cycles * converting it into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something * reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII * content. * * XXX Don't bother optimizing the string length error check. It is not * worth the complexity. */ asn1_type = ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str); if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) { msg_warn("%s: %s: error decoding peer %s of ASN.1 type=%d", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, asn1_type); tls_print_errors(); return (0); } /* * No returns without cleaning up. A good optimizer will replace multiple * blocks of identical code by jumps to just one such block. */ #define TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(x) do { \ char *__tls_text_name_temp = (x); \ OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); \ return (__tls_text_name_temp); \ } while (0) /* * Remove trailing null characters. They would give false alarms with the * length check and with the embedded null check. */ #define TRIM0(s, l) do { while ((l) > 0 && (s)[(l)-1] == 0) --(l); } while (0) TRIM0(utf8_value, utf8_length); /* * Enforce the length limit, because the caller will copy the result into * a fixed-length buffer. */ if (utf8_length >= CCERT_BUFSIZ) { msg_warn("%s: %s: peer %s too long: %d", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, utf8_length); TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0); } /* * Reject embedded nulls in ASCII or UTF-8 names. OpenSSL is responsible * for producing properly-formatted UTF-8. */ if (utf8_length != strlen((char *) utf8_value)) { msg_warn("%s: %s: NULL character in peer %s", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0); } /* * Reject non-printable ASCII characters in UTF-8 content. * * Note: the code below does not find control characters in illegal UTF-8 * sequences. It's OpenSSL's job to produce valid UTF-8, and reportedly, * it does validation. */ for (cp = utf8_value; (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) { if (ISASCII(ch) && !ISPRINT(ch)) { msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable content in peer %s", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label); TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0); } } TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(mystrdup((char *) utf8_value)); } /* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */ const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { const char *myname = "tls_dns_name"; char *cp; const char *dnsname; int len; /* * Peername checks are security sensitive, carefully scrutinize the * input! */ if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) msg_panic("%s: Non DNS input argument", myname); /* * We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as * ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member. */ if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) { msg_warn("%s: %s: invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName", myname, TLScontext->namaddr); return (0); } /* * Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name */ dnsname = (const char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5); len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5); TRIM0(dnsname, len); /* * Per Dr. Steven Henson of the OpenSSL development team, ASN1_IA5STRING * values can have internal ASCII NUL values in this context because * their length is taken from the decoded ASN1 buffer, a trailing NUL is * always appended to make sure that the string is terminated, but the * ASN.1 length may differ from strlen(). */ if (len != strlen(dnsname)) { msg_warn("%s: %s: internal NUL in subjectAltName", myname, TLScontext->namaddr); return 0; } /* * XXX: Should we be more strict and call valid_hostname()? So long as * the name is safe to handle, if it is not a valid hostname, it will not * compare equal to the expected peername, so being more strict than * "printable" is likely excessive... */ if (*dnsname && !allprint(dnsname)) { cp = mystrdup(dnsname); msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable characters in subjectAltName: %.100s", myname, TLScontext->namaddr, printable(cp, '?')); myfree(cp); return 0; } return (dnsname); } /* tls_peer_CN - extract peer common name from certificate */ char *tls_peer_CN(X509 *peercert, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { char *cn; cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(peercert), NID_commonName, "subject CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE); return (cn ? cn : mystrdup("")); } /* tls_issuer_CN - extract issuer common name from certificate */ char *tls_issuer_CN(X509 *peer, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { X509_NAME *name; char *cn; name = X509_get_issuer_name(peer); /* * If no issuer CN field, use Organization instead. CA certs without a CN * are common, so we only complain if the organization is also missing. */ if ((cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_commonName, "issuer CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0) cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_organizationName, "issuer Organization", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE); return (cn ? cn : mystrdup("")); } #endif