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The BIND 9 Lightweight Resolver"> </head> <body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"> <div class="navheader"> <table width="100%" summary="Navigation header"> <tr><th colspan="3" align="center">Chapter 4. Advanced DNS Features</th></tr> <tr> <td width="20%" align="left"> <a accesskey="p" href="Bv9ARM.ch03.html">Prev</a> </td> <th width="60%" align="center"> </th> <td width="20%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="Bv9ARM.ch05.html">Next</a> </td> </tr> </table> <hr> </div> <div class="chapter" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"> <a name="Bv9ARM.ch04"></a>Chapter 4. Advanced DNS Features</h2></div></div></div> <div class="toc"> <p><b>Table of Contents</b></p> <dl> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#notify">Notify</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#dynamic_update">Dynamic Update</a></span></dt> <dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#journal">The journal file</a></span></dt></dl></dd> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#incremental_zone_transfers">Incremental Zone Transfers (IXFR)</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2570509">Split DNS</a></span></dt> <dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2570528">Example split DNS setup</a></span></dt></dl></dd> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#tsig">TSIG</a></span></dt> <dd><dl> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571168">Generate Shared Keys for Each Pair of Hosts</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571241">Copying the Shared Secret to Both Machines</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571252">Informing the Servers of the Key's Existence</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571291">Instructing the Server to Use the Key</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571485">TSIG Key Based Access Control</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571530">Errors</a></span></dt> </dl></dd> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571612">TKEY</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571661">SIG(0)</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#DNSSEC">DNSSEC</a></span></dt> <dd><dl> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571798">Generating Keys</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571877">Signing the Zone</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2571958">Configuring Servers</a></span></dt> </dl></dd> <dt><span class="sect1"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2572101">IPv6 Support in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9</a></span></dt> <dd><dl> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2572163">Address Lookups Using AAAA Records</a></span></dt> <dt><span class="sect2"><a href="Bv9ARM.ch04.html#id2572184">Address to Name Lookups Using Nibble Format</a></span></dt> </dl></dd> </dl> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="notify"></a>Notify</h2></div></div></div> <p> <acronym class="acronym">DNS</acronym> NOTIFY is a mechanism that allows master servers to notify their slave servers of changes to a zone's data. In response to a <span><strong class="command">NOTIFY</strong></span> from a master server, the slave will check to see that its version of the zone is the current version and, if not, initiate a zone transfer. </p> <p> For more information about <acronym class="acronym">DNS</acronym> <span><strong class="command">NOTIFY</strong></span>, see the description of the <span><strong class="command">notify</strong></span> option in <a href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#boolean_options" title="Boolean Options">the section called “Boolean Options”</a> and the description of the zone option <span><strong class="command">also-notify</strong></span> in <a href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#zone_transfers" title="Zone Transfers">the section called “Zone Transfers”</a>. The <span><strong class="command">NOTIFY</strong></span> protocol is specified in RFC 1996. </p> <div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"> <h3 class="title">Note</h3> As a slave zone can also be a master to other slaves, named, by default, sends <span><strong class="command">NOTIFY</strong></span> messages for every zone it loads. Specifying <span><strong class="command">notify master-only;</strong></span> will cause named to only send <span><strong class="command">NOTIFY</strong></span> for master zones that it loads. </div> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="dynamic_update"></a>Dynamic Update</h2></div></div></div> <p> Dynamic Update is a method for adding, replacing or deleting records in a master server by sending it a special form of DNS messages. The format and meaning of these messages is specified in RFC 2136. </p> <p> Dynamic update is enabled by including an <span><strong class="command">allow-update</strong></span> or <span><strong class="command">update-policy</strong></span> clause in the <span><strong class="command">zone</strong></span> statement. The <span><strong class="command">tkey-gssapi-credential</strong></span> and <span><strong class="command">tkey-domain</strong></span> clauses in the <span><strong class="command">options</strong></span> statement enable the server to negotiate keys that can be matched against those in <span><strong class="command">update-policy</strong></span> or <span><strong class="command">allow-update</strong></span>. </p> <p> Updating of secure zones (zones using DNSSEC) follows RFC 3007: RRSIG, NSEC and NSEC3 records affected by updates are automatically regenerated by the server using an online zone key. Update authorization is based on transaction signatures and an explicit server policy. </p> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="journal"></a>The journal file</h3></div></div></div> <p> All changes made to a zone using dynamic update are stored in the zone's journal file. This file is automatically created by the server when the first dynamic update takes place. The name of the journal file is formed by appending the extension <code class="filename">.jnl</code> to the name of the corresponding zone file unless specifically overridden. The journal file is in a binary format and should not be edited manually. </p> <p> The server will also occasionally write ("dump") the complete contents of the updated zone to its zone file. This is not done immediately after each dynamic update, because that would be too slow when a large zone is updated frequently. Instead, the dump is delayed by up to 15 minutes, allowing additional updates to take place. </p> <p> When a server is restarted after a shutdown or crash, it will replay the journal file to incorporate into the zone any updates that took place after the last zone dump. </p> <p> Changes that result from incoming incremental zone transfers are also journalled in a similar way. </p> <p> The zone files of dynamic zones cannot normally be edited by hand because they are not guaranteed to contain the most recent dynamic changes — those are only in the journal file. The only way to ensure that the zone file of a dynamic zone is up to date is to run <span><strong class="command">rndc stop</strong></span>. </p> <p> If you have to make changes to a dynamic zone manually, the following procedure will work: Disable dynamic updates to the zone using <span><strong class="command">rndc freeze <em class="replaceable"><code>zone</code></em></strong></span>. This will also remove the zone's <code class="filename">.jnl</code> file and update the master file. Edit the zone file. Run <span><strong class="command">rndc thaw <em class="replaceable"><code>zone</code></em></strong></span> to reload the changed zone and re-enable dynamic updates. </p> </div> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="incremental_zone_transfers"></a>Incremental Zone Transfers (IXFR)</h2></div></div></div> <p> The incremental zone transfer (IXFR) protocol is a way for slave servers to transfer only changed data, instead of having to transfer the entire zone. The IXFR protocol is specified in RFC 1995. See <a href="Bv9ARM.ch09.html#proposed_standards">Proposed Standards</a>. </p> <p> When acting as a master, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supports IXFR for those zones where the necessary change history information is available. These include master zones maintained by dynamic update and slave zones whose data was obtained by IXFR. For manually maintained master zones, and for slave zones obtained by performing a full zone transfer (AXFR), IXFR is supported only if the option <span><strong class="command">ixfr-from-differences</strong></span> is set to <strong class="userinput"><code>yes</code></strong>. </p> <p> When acting as a slave, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 will attempt to use IXFR unless it is explicitly disabled. For more information about disabling IXFR, see the description of the <span><strong class="command">request-ixfr</strong></span> clause of the <span><strong class="command">server</strong></span> statement. </p> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="id2570509"></a>Split DNS</h2></div></div></div> <p> Setting up different views, or visibility, of the DNS space to internal and external resolvers is usually referred to as a <span class="emphasis"><em>Split DNS</em></span> setup. There are several reasons an organization would want to set up its DNS this way. </p> <p> One common reason for setting up a DNS system this way is to hide "internal" DNS information from "external" clients on the Internet. There is some debate as to whether or not this is actually useful. Internal DNS information leaks out in many ways (via email headers, for example) and most savvy "attackers" can find the information they need using other means. However, since listing addresses of internal servers that external clients cannot possibly reach can result in connection delays and other annoyances, an organization may choose to use a Split DNS to present a consistent view of itself to the outside world. </p> <p> Another common reason for setting up a Split DNS system is to allow internal networks that are behind filters or in RFC 1918 space (reserved IP space, as documented in RFC 1918) to resolve DNS on the Internet. Split DNS can also be used to allow mail from outside back in to the internal network. </p> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2570528"></a>Example split DNS setup</h3></div></div></div> <p> Let's say a company named <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span> (<code class="literal">example.com</code>) has several corporate sites that have an internal network with reserved Internet Protocol (IP) space and an external demilitarized zone (DMZ), or "outside" section of a network, that is available to the public. </p> <p> <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span> wants its internal clients to be able to resolve external hostnames and to exchange mail with people on the outside. The company also wants its internal resolvers to have access to certain internal-only zones that are not available at all outside of the internal network. </p> <p> In order to accomplish this, the company will set up two sets of name servers. One set will be on the inside network (in the reserved IP space) and the other set will be on bastion hosts, which are "proxy" hosts that can talk to both sides of its network, in the DMZ. </p> <p> The internal servers will be configured to forward all queries, except queries for <code class="filename">site1.internal</code>, <code class="filename">site2.internal</code>, <code class="filename">site1.example.com</code>, and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code>, to the servers in the DMZ. These internal servers will have complete sets of information for <code class="filename">site1.example.com</code>, <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code>,<span class="emphasis"><em></em></span> <code class="filename">site1.internal</code>, and <code class="filename">site2.internal</code>. </p> <p> To protect the <code class="filename">site1.internal</code> and <code class="filename">site2.internal</code> domains, the internal name servers must be configured to disallow all queries to these domains from any external hosts, including the bastion hosts. </p> <p> The external servers, which are on the bastion hosts, will be configured to serve the "public" version of the <code class="filename">site1</code> and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code> zones. This could include things such as the host records for public servers (<code class="filename">www.example.com</code> and <code class="filename">ftp.example.com</code>), and mail exchange (MX) records (<code class="filename">a.mx.example.com</code> and <code class="filename">b.mx.example.com</code>). </p> <p> In addition, the public <code class="filename">site1</code> and <code class="filename">site2.example.com</code> zones should have special MX records that contain wildcard (`*') records pointing to the bastion hosts. This is needed because external mail servers do not have any other way of looking up how to deliver mail to those internal hosts. With the wildcard records, the mail will be delivered to the bastion host, which can then forward it on to internal hosts. </p> <p> Here's an example of a wildcard MX record: </p> <pre class="programlisting">* IN MX 10 external1.example.com.</pre> <p> Now that they accept mail on behalf of anything in the internal network, the bastion hosts will need to know how to deliver mail to internal hosts. In order for this to work properly, the resolvers on the bastion hosts will need to be configured to point to the internal name servers for DNS resolution. </p> <p> Queries for internal hostnames will be answered by the internal servers, and queries for external hostnames will be forwarded back out to the DNS servers on the bastion hosts. </p> <p> In order for all this to work properly, internal clients will need to be configured to query <span class="emphasis"><em>only</em></span> the internal name servers for DNS queries. This could also be enforced via selective filtering on the network. </p> <p> If everything has been set properly, <span class="emphasis"><em>Example, Inc.</em></span>'s internal clients will now be able to: </p> <div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"> <li> Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1</code> and <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones. </li> <li> Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1.internal</code> and <code class="literal">site2.internal</code> domains. </li> <li>Look up any hostnames on the Internet.</li> <li>Exchange mail with both internal and external people.</li> </ul></div> <p> Hosts on the Internet will be able to: </p> <div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"> <li> Look up any hostnames in the <code class="literal">site1</code> and <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones. </li> <li> Exchange mail with anyone in the <code class="literal">site1</code> and <code class="literal">site2.example.com</code> zones. </li> </ul></div> <p> Here is an example configuration for the setup we just described above. Note that this is only configuration information; for information on how to configure your zone files, see <a href="Bv9ARM.ch03.html#sample_configuration" title="Sample Configurations">the section called “Sample Configurations”</a>. </p> <p> Internal DNS server config: </p> <pre class="programlisting"> acl internals { 172.16.72.0/24; 192.168.1.0/24; }; acl externals { <code class="varname">bastion-ips-go-here</code>; }; options { ... ... forward only; forwarders { // forward to external servers <code class="varname">bastion-ips-go-here</code>; }; allow-transfer { none; }; // sample allow-transfer (no one) allow-query { internals; externals; }; // restrict query access allow-recursion { internals; }; // restrict recursion ... ... }; zone "site1.example.com" { // sample master zone type master; file "m/site1.example.com"; forwarders { }; // do normal iterative // resolution (do not forward) allow-query { internals; externals; }; allow-transfer { internals; }; }; zone "site2.example.com" { // sample slave zone type slave; file "s/site2.example.com"; masters { 172.16.72.3; }; forwarders { }; allow-query { internals; externals; }; allow-transfer { internals; }; }; zone "site1.internal" { type master; file "m/site1.internal"; forwarders { }; allow-query { internals; }; allow-transfer { internals; } }; zone "site2.internal" { type slave; file "s/site2.internal"; masters { 172.16.72.3; }; forwarders { }; allow-query { internals }; allow-transfer { internals; } }; </pre> <p> External (bastion host) DNS server config: </p> <pre class="programlisting"> acl internals { 172.16.72.0/24; 192.168.1.0/24; }; acl externals { bastion-ips-go-here; }; options { ... ... allow-transfer { none; }; // sample allow-transfer (no one) allow-query { any; }; // default query access allow-query-cache { internals; externals; }; // restrict cache access allow-recursion { internals; externals; }; // restrict recursion ... ... }; zone "site1.example.com" { // sample slave zone type master; file "m/site1.foo.com"; allow-transfer { internals; externals; }; }; zone "site2.example.com" { type slave; file "s/site2.foo.com"; masters { another_bastion_host_maybe; }; allow-transfer { internals; externals; } }; </pre> <p> In the <code class="filename">resolv.conf</code> (or equivalent) on the bastion host(s): </p> <pre class="programlisting"> search ... nameserver 172.16.72.2 nameserver 172.16.72.3 nameserver 172.16.72.4 </pre> </div> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="tsig"></a>TSIG</h2></div></div></div> <p> This is a short guide to setting up Transaction SIGnatures (TSIG) based transaction security in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>. It describes changes to the configuration file as well as what changes are required for different features, including the process of creating transaction keys and using transaction signatures with <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>. </p> <p> <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> primarily supports TSIG for server to server communication. This includes zone transfer, notify, and recursive query messages. Resolvers based on newer versions of <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 8 have limited support for TSIG. </p> <p> TSIG can also be useful for dynamic update. A primary server for a dynamic zone should control access to the dynamic update service, but IP-based access control is insufficient. The cryptographic access control provided by TSIG is far superior. The <span><strong class="command">nsupdate</strong></span> program supports TSIG via the <code class="option">-k</code> and <code class="option">-y</code> command line options or inline by use of the <span><strong class="command">key</strong></span>. </p> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571168"></a>Generate Shared Keys for Each Pair of Hosts</h3></div></div></div> <p> A shared secret is generated to be shared between <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> and <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span>. An arbitrary key name is chosen: "host1-host2.". The key name must be the same on both hosts. </p> <div class="sect3" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"> <a name="id2571185"></a>Automatic Generation</h4></div></div></div> <p> The following command will generate a 128-bit (16 byte) HMAC-MD5 key as described above. Longer keys are better, but shorter keys are easier to read. Note that the maximum key length is 512 bits; keys longer than that will be digested with MD5 to produce a 128-bit key. </p> <p> <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keygen -a hmac-md5 -b 128 -n HOST host1-host2.</code></strong> </p> <p> The key is in the file <code class="filename">Khost1-host2.+157+00000.private</code>. Nothing directly uses this file, but the base-64 encoded string following "<code class="literal">Key:</code>" can be extracted from the file and used as a shared secret: </p> <pre class="programlisting">Key: La/E5CjG9O+os1jq0a2jdA==</pre> <p> The string "<code class="literal">La/E5CjG9O+os1jq0a2jdA==</code>" can be used as the shared secret. </p> </div> <div class="sect3" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"> <a name="id2571223"></a>Manual Generation</h4></div></div></div> <p> The shared secret is simply a random sequence of bits, encoded in base-64. Most ASCII strings are valid base-64 strings (assuming the length is a multiple of 4 and only valid characters are used), so the shared secret can be manually generated. </p> <p> Also, a known string can be run through <span><strong class="command">mmencode</strong></span> or a similar program to generate base-64 encoded data. </p> </div> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571241"></a>Copying the Shared Secret to Both Machines</h3></div></div></div> <p> This is beyond the scope of DNS. A secure transport mechanism should be used. This could be secure FTP, ssh, telephone, etc. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571252"></a>Informing the Servers of the Key's Existence</h3></div></div></div> <p> Imagine <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> and <span class="emphasis"><em>host 2</em></span> are both servers. The following is added to each server's <code class="filename">named.conf</code> file: </p> <pre class="programlisting"> key host1-host2. { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "La/E5CjG9O+os1jq0a2jdA=="; }; </pre> <p> The algorithm, hmac-md5, is the only one supported by <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym>. The secret is the one generated above. Since this is a secret, it is recommended that either <code class="filename">named.conf</code> be non-world readable, or the key directive be added to a non-world readable file that is included by <code class="filename">named.conf</code>. </p> <p> At this point, the key is recognized. This means that if the server receives a message signed by this key, it can verify the signature. If the signature is successfully verified, the response is signed by the same key. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571291"></a>Instructing the Server to Use the Key</h3></div></div></div> <p> Since keys are shared between two hosts only, the server must be told when keys are to be used. The following is added to the <code class="filename">named.conf</code> file for <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>, if the IP address of <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span> is 10.1.2.3: </p> <pre class="programlisting"> server 10.1.2.3 { keys { host1-host2. ;}; }; </pre> <p> Multiple keys may be present, but only the first is used. This directive does not contain any secrets, so it may be in a world-readable file. </p> <p> If <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> sends a message that is a request to that address, the message will be signed with the specified key. <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span> will expect any responses to signed messages to be signed with the same key. </p> <p> A similar statement must be present in <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span>'s configuration file (with <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>'s address) for <span class="emphasis"><em>host2</em></span> to sign request messages to <span class="emphasis"><em>host1</em></span>. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571485"></a>TSIG Key Based Access Control</h3></div></div></div> <p> <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> allows IP addresses and ranges to be specified in ACL definitions and <span><strong class="command">allow-{ query | transfer | update }</strong></span> directives. This has been extended to allow TSIG keys also. The above key would be denoted <span><strong class="command">key host1-host2.</strong></span> </p> <p> An example of an allow-update directive would be: </p> <pre class="programlisting"> allow-update { key host1-host2. ;}; </pre> <p> This allows dynamic updates to succeed only if the request was signed by a key named "<span><strong class="command">host1-host2.</strong></span>". </p> <p> You may want to read about the more powerful <span><strong class="command">update-policy</strong></span> statement in <a href="Bv9ARM.ch06.html#dynamic_update_policies" title="Dynamic Update Policies">the section called “Dynamic Update Policies”</a>. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571530"></a>Errors</h3></div></div></div> <p> The processing of TSIG signed messages can result in several errors. If a signed message is sent to a non-TSIG aware server, a FORMERR (format error) will be returned, since the server will not understand the record. This is a result of misconfiguration, since the server must be explicitly configured to send a TSIG signed message to a specific server. </p> <p> If a TSIG aware server receives a message signed by an unknown key, the response will be unsigned with the TSIG extended error code set to BADKEY. If a TSIG aware server receives a message with a signature that does not validate, the response will be unsigned with the TSIG extended error code set to BADSIG. If a TSIG aware server receives a message with a time outside of the allowed range, the response will be signed with the TSIG extended error code set to BADTIME, and the time values will be adjusted so that the response can be successfully verified. In any of these cases, the message's rcode (response code) is set to NOTAUTH (not authenticated). </p> </div> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="id2571612"></a>TKEY</h2></div></div></div> <p><span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> is a mechanism for automatically generating a shared secret between two hosts. There are several "modes" of <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> that specify how the key is generated or assigned. <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 implements only one of these modes, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Both hosts are required to have a Diffie-Hellman KEY record (although this record is not required to be present in a zone). The <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> process must use signed messages, signed either by TSIG or SIG(0). The result of <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> is a shared secret that can be used to sign messages with TSIG. <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> can also be used to delete shared secrets that it had previously generated. </p> <p> The <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> process is initiated by a client or server by sending a signed <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> query (including any appropriate KEYs) to a TKEY-aware server. The server response, if it indicates success, will contain a <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> record and any appropriate keys. After this exchange, both participants have enough information to determine the shared secret; the exact process depends on the <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> mode. When using the Diffie-Hellman <span><strong class="command">TKEY</strong></span> mode, Diffie-Hellman keys are exchanged, and the shared secret is derived by both participants. </p> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="id2571661"></a>SIG(0)</h2></div></div></div> <p> <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as specified in RFC 2535 and RFC2931. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied based on the key name. </p> <p> When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it will only be verified if the key is known and trusted by the server; the server will not attempt to locate and/or validate the key. </p> <p> SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported. </p> <p> The only tool shipped with <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages is <span><strong class="command">nsupdate</strong></span>. </p> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="DNSSEC"></a>DNSSEC</h2></div></div></div> <p> Cryptographic authentication of DNS information is possible through the DNS Security (<span class="emphasis"><em>DNSSEC-bis</em></span>) extensions, defined in RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035. This section describes the creation and use of DNSSEC signed zones. </p> <p> In order to set up a DNSSEC secure zone, there are a series of steps which must be followed. <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 ships with several tools that are used in this process, which are explained in more detail below. In all cases, the <code class="option">-h</code> option prints a full list of parameters. Note that the DNSSEC tools require the keyset files to be in the working directory or the directory specified by the <code class="option">-d</code> option, and that the tools shipped with BIND 9.2.x and earlier are not compatible with the current ones. </p> <p> There must also be communication with the administrators of the parent and/or child zone to transmit keys. A zone's security status must be indicated by the parent zone for a DNSSEC capable resolver to trust its data. This is done through the presence or absence of a <code class="literal">DS</code> record at the delegation point. </p> <p> For other servers to trust data in this zone, they must either be statically configured with this zone's zone key or the zone key of another zone above this one in the DNS tree. </p> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571798"></a>Generating Keys</h3></div></div></div> <p> The <span><strong class="command">dnssec-keygen</strong></span> program is used to generate keys. </p> <p> A secure zone must contain one or more zone keys. The zone keys will sign all other records in the zone, as well as the zone keys of any secure delegated zones. Zone keys must have the same name as the zone, a name type of <span><strong class="command">ZONE</strong></span>, and must be usable for authentication. It is recommended that zone keys use a cryptographic algorithm designated as "mandatory to implement" by the IETF; currently the only one is RSASHA1. </p> <p> The following command will generate a 768-bit RSASHA1 key for the <code class="filename">child.example</code> zone: </p> <p> <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 768 -n ZONE child.example.</code></strong> </p> <p> Two output files will be produced: <code class="filename">Kchild.example.+005+12345.key</code> and <code class="filename">Kchild.example.+005+12345.private</code> (where 12345 is an example of a key tag). The key filenames contain the key name (<code class="filename">child.example.</code>), algorithm (3 is DSA, 1 is RSAMD5, 5 is RSASHA1, etc.), and the key tag (12345 in this case). The private key (in the <code class="filename">.private</code> file) is used to generate signatures, and the public key (in the <code class="filename">.key</code> file) is used for signature verification. </p> <p> To generate another key with the same properties (but with a different key tag), repeat the above command. </p> <p> The <span><strong class="command">dnssec-keyfromlabel</strong></span> program is used to get a key pair from a crypto hardware and build the key files. Its usage is similar to <span><strong class="command">dnssec-keygen</strong></span>. </p> <p> The public keys should be inserted into the zone file by including the <code class="filename">.key</code> files using <span><strong class="command">$INCLUDE</strong></span> statements. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571877"></a>Signing the Zone</h3></div></div></div> <p> The <span><strong class="command">dnssec-signzone</strong></span> program is used to sign a zone. </p> <p> Any <code class="filename">keyset</code> files corresponding to secure subzones should be present. The zone signer will generate <code class="literal">NSEC</code>, <code class="literal">NSEC3</code> and <code class="literal">RRSIG</code> records for the zone, as well as <code class="literal">DS</code> for the child zones if <code class="literal">'-g'</code> is specified. If <code class="literal">'-g'</code> is not specified, then DS RRsets for the secure child zones need to be added manually. </p> <p> The following command signs the zone, assuming it is in a file called <code class="filename">zone.child.example</code>. By default, all zone keys which have an available private key are used to generate signatures. </p> <p> <strong class="userinput"><code>dnssec-signzone -o child.example zone.child.example</code></strong> </p> <p> One output file is produced: <code class="filename">zone.child.example.signed</code>. This file should be referenced by <code class="filename">named.conf</code> as the input file for the zone. </p> <p><span><strong class="command">dnssec-signzone</strong></span> will also produce a keyset and dsset files and optionally a dlvset file. These are used to provide the parent zone administrators with the <code class="literal">DNSKEYs</code> (or their corresponding <code class="literal">DS</code> records) that are the secure entry point to the zone. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2571958"></a>Configuring Servers</h3></div></div></div> <p> To enable <span><strong class="command">named</strong></span> to respond appropriately to DNS requests from DNSSEC aware clients, <span><strong class="command">dnssec-enable</strong></span> must be set to yes. </p> <p> To enable <span><strong class="command">named</strong></span> to validate answers from other servers both <span><strong class="command">dnssec-enable</strong></span> and <span><strong class="command">dnssec-validation</strong></span> must be set and some <span><strong class="command">trusted-keys</strong></span> must be configured into <code class="filename">named.conf</code>. </p> <p> <span><strong class="command">trusted-keys</strong></span> are copies of DNSKEY RRs for zones that are used to form the first link in the cryptographic chain of trust. All keys listed in <span><strong class="command">trusted-keys</strong></span> (and corresponding zones) are deemed to exist and only the listed keys will be used to validated the DNSKEY RRset that they are from. </p> <p> <span><strong class="command">trusted-keys</strong></span> are described in more detail later in this document. </p> <p> Unlike <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 8, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 does not verify signatures on load, so zone keys for authoritative zones do not need to be specified in the configuration file. </p> <p> After DNSSEC gets established, a typical DNSSEC configuration will look something like the following. It has a one or more public keys for the root. This allows answers from outside the organization to be validated. It will also have several keys for parts of the namespace the organization controls. These are here to ensure that named is immune to compromises in the DNSSEC components of the security of parent zones. </p> <pre class="programlisting"> trusted-keys { /* Root Key */ "." 257 3 3 "BNY4wrWM1nCfJ+CXd0rVXyYmobt7sEEfK3clRbGaTwSJxrGkxJWoZu6I7PzJu/ E9gx4UC1zGAHlXKdE4zYIpRhaBKnvcC2U9mZhkdUpd1Vso/HAdjNe8LmMlnzY3 zy2Xy4klWOADTPzSv9eamj8V18PHGjBLaVtYvk/ln5ZApjYghf+6fElrmLkdaz MQ2OCnACR817DF4BBa7UR/beDHyp5iWTXWSi6XmoJLbG9Scqc7l70KDqlvXR3M /lUUVRbkeg1IPJSidmK3ZyCllh4XSKbje/45SKucHgnwU5jefMtq66gKodQj+M iA21AfUVe7u99WzTLzY3qlxDhxYQQ20FQ97S+LKUTpQcq27R7AT3/V5hRQxScI Nqwcz4jYqZD2fQdgxbcDTClU0CRBdiieyLMNzXG3"; /* Key for our organization's forward zone */ example.com. 257 3 5 "AwEAAaxPMcR2x0HbQV4WeZB6oEDX+r0QM65KbhTjrW1ZaARmPhEZZe 3Y9ifgEuq7vZ/zGZUdEGNWy+JZzus0lUptwgjGwhUS1558Hb4JKUbb OTcM8pwXlj0EiX3oDFVmjHO444gLkBO UKUf/mC7HvfwYH/Be22GnC lrinKJp1Og4ywzO9WglMk7jbfW33gUKvirTHr25GL7STQUzBb5Usxt 8lgnyTUHs1t3JwCY5hKZ6CqFxmAVZP20igTixin/1LcrgX/KMEGd/b iuvF4qJCyduieHukuY3H4XMAcR+xia2 nIUPvm/oyWR8BW/hWdzOvn SCThlHf3xiYleDbt/o1OTQ09A0="; /* Key for our reverse zone. */ 2.0.192.IN-ADDRPA.NET. 257 3 5 "AQOnS4xn/IgOUpBPJ3bogzwcxOdNax071L18QqZnQQQA VVr+iLhGTnNGp3HoWQLUIzKrJVZ3zggy3WwNT6kZo6c0 tszYqbtvchmgQC8CzKojM/W16i6MG/ea fGU3siaOdS0 yOI6BgPsw+YZdzlYMaIJGf4M4dyoKIhzdZyQ2bYQrjyQ 4LB0lC7aOnsMyYKHHYeRv PxjIQXmdqgOJGq+vsevG06 zW+1xgYJh9rCIfnm1GX/KMgxLPG2vXTD/RnLX+D3T3UL 7HJYHJhAZD5L59VvjSPsZJHeDCUyWYrvPZesZDIRvhDD 52SKvbheeTJUm6EhkzytNN2SN96QRk8j/iI8ib"; }; options { ... dnssec-enable yes; dnssec-validation yes; }; </pre> <div class="note" style="margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;"> <h3 class="title">Note</h3> None of the keys listed in this example are valid. In particular, the root key is not valid. </div> </div> </div> <div class="sect1" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"> <a name="id2572101"></a>IPv6 Support in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9</h2></div></div></div> <p> <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 fully supports all currently defined forms of IPv6 name to address and address to name lookups. It will also use IPv6 addresses to make queries when running on an IPv6 capable system. </p> <p> For forward lookups, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supports only AAAA records. RFC 3363 deprecated the use of A6 records, and client-side support for A6 records was accordingly removed from <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9. However, authoritative <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 name servers still load zone files containing A6 records correctly, answer queries for A6 records, and accept zone transfer for a zone containing A6 records. </p> <p> For IPv6 reverse lookups, <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supports the traditional "nibble" format used in the <span class="emphasis"><em>ip6.arpa</em></span> domain, as well as the older, deprecated <span class="emphasis"><em>ip6.int</em></span> domain. Older versions of <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 supported the "binary label" (also known as "bitstring") format, but support of binary labels has been completely removed per RFC 3363. Many applications in <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 do not understand the binary label format at all any more, and will return an error if given. In particular, an authoritative <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 name server will not load a zone file containing binary labels. </p> <p> For an overview of the format and structure of IPv6 addresses, see <a href="Bv9ARM.ch09.html#ipv6addresses" title="IPv6 addresses (AAAA)">the section called “IPv6 addresses (AAAA)”</a>. </p> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2572163"></a>Address Lookups Using AAAA Records</h3></div></div></div> <p> The IPv6 AAAA record is a parallel to the IPv4 A record, and, unlike the deprecated A6 record, specifies the entire IPv6 address in a single record. For example, </p> <pre class="programlisting"> $ORIGIN example.com. host 3600 IN AAAA 2001:db8::1 </pre> <p> Use of IPv4-in-IPv6 mapped addresses is not recommended. If a host has an IPv4 address, use an A record, not a AAAA, with <code class="literal">::ffff:192.168.42.1</code> as the address. </p> </div> <div class="sect2" lang="en"> <div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"> <a name="id2572184"></a>Address to Name Lookups Using Nibble Format</h3></div></div></div> <p> When looking up an address in nibble format, the address components are simply reversed, just as in IPv4, and <code class="literal">ip6.arpa.</code> is appended to the resulting name. For example, the following would provide reverse name lookup for a host with address <code class="literal">2001:db8::1</code>. </p> <pre class="programlisting"> $ORIGIN 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. 1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0 14400 IN PTR host.example.com. </pre> </div> </div> </div> <div class="navfooter"> <hr> <table width="100%" summary="Navigation footer"> <tr> <td width="40%" align="left"> <a accesskey="p" href="Bv9ARM.ch03.html">Prev</a> </td> <td width="20%" align="center"> </td> <td width="40%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="Bv9ARM.ch05.html">Next</a> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="40%" align="left" valign="top">Chapter 3. Name Server Configuration </td> <td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="h" href="Bv9ARM.html">Home</a></td> <td width="40%" align="right" valign="top"> Chapter 5. The <acronym class="acronym">BIND</acronym> 9 Lightweight Resolver</td> </tr> </table> </div> </body> </html>