draft-zhu-ws-kerb-01.txt [plain text]
NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu
Internet-Draft Microsoft Corporation
Updates: 4120 (if approved) October 2006
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 4, 2007
Kerberos for Web Services
draft-zhu-ws-kerb-01
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol and the
GSS-API Kerberos mechanism that enable a GSS-API Kerberos client to
exchange messages with the KDC using the GSS-API acceptor as the
proxy, by encapsulating the Kerberos messages inside GSS-API tokens.
With these extensions, Kerberos is suitable for securing
communication between the client and web services over the Internet.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. GSS-API Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Addresses in Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. Introduction
The Kerberos [RFC4120] pre-authentication framework [KRB-PAFW]
promises minimal or no exposure of weak client keys and strong client
authentication. The Kerberos support of anonymity [KRB-ANON]
provides for privacy. These advancements make Kerberos suitable over
the Internet.
The traditional client-push Kerberos protocol does not work well in
the Web services environments where the KDC is not accessible to the
client, but is accessible to the web server. For example, the KDC is
commonly placed behind a firewall together with the application
server. The lack of accessibility to the KDC by the client could
also occur are when the client does not have an IP address prior to
authenticating to an access point.
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
[RFC2743] allows security mechanisms exchange arbitrary messages
between the initiator and the acceptor via the application traffic,
independent of the underlying transports. A protocol based on
[RFC4121] is thus defined to allow the GSS-API initiator to exchange
Kerberos messages with the KDC by using the GSS-API acceptor as the
proxy. The acceptor-pull model defined in this specification is
benefical for initiators with limited processing power such as mobile
devices, or when the transport layer between the initiator and the
acceptor has high network latency.
Client --------- WS-KERB proxy ---------- KDC
The Kerberos client MUST avoid exposure of long term client keys to
the GSS-API acceptor, before and after the Kerberos server is
authenticated. This can be accomplished by using Kerberos-FAST [KRB-
PAFW]. Furthermore, the initiator can use the anonymous option as
defined in Section 6.5.2 of [KRB-PAFW], to hide the client identity
from adversary who can eavesdrop the application traffic.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. GSS-API Encapsulation
The mechanism Objection Identifier (OID) for GSS-API WS-KERB, in
accordance with the mechanism proposed by [RFC4178] for negotiating
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protocol variations, is id-kerberos-ws.
id-kerberos-ws ::=
{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
webService(6) }
The first token of the GSS-API WS-KERB mechanism MUST have the
generic token framing described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743] with the
mechanism OID being id-kerberos-ws, and any subsequent GSS-API WS-
KERB token MUST NOT have this framing.
The GSS-API WS-KERB mechanism MUST always provide mutual
authentication, even if the initiator does not ask for it. When
mutual-authentication is performed, the GSS-API acceptor will always
send back an AP-REP, and as described later in this section this
mechanism provides integrity protection for all initiator-acceptor
proxy message exchanges.
The innerToken described in section 3.1 of [RFC2743] and subsequent
GSS-API tokens have the following formats: it starts with a two-octet
token-identifier (TOK_ID), followed by a WS-KERB message or a
Kerberos message.
Token/Message TOK_ID Value in Hex
-----------------------------------------
WS_KRB_PROXY 05 01
Only one WS-KERB specific message, namely the WS_KRB_PROXY message,
is defined in this document. The TOK_ID values for [RFC4120]
Kerberos messages are the same as those defined for the GSS-API
Kerberos mechanism [RFC4121].
The message of the WS_KRB_PROXY type is defined as a WS-KRB-HEADER
structure immediately followed by a Kerberos message. The Kerberos
message can be an AS-REQ, an AS-REP, a TGS-REQ, a TGS-REP, or a KRB-
ERROR as defined in [RFC4120].
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WS-KRB-HEADER ::= SEQUENCE {
proxy-data [1] ProxyData,
...
}
ProxyData :: = SEQUENCE {
realm [1] Realm,
cookie [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- opaque data, if sent by the acceptor,
-- MUST be copied by the client unchanged into
-- the next WS-KERB message.
...
}
The WS-KRB-HEADER structure and all the Kerberos messages MUST be
encoded using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690].
The GSS-API initiator fills out the realm field in the ProxyData of
the first request with the client realm. If the client does not know
the client realm [REFERALS], it MUST fill it out using the client's
default realm name such as the realm of the client host. Typically
the Kerberos message in the first WS_KRB_PROXY message from the
client is an AS-REQ message.
Upon receipt of the WS_KRB_PROXY message, the GSS-API WS-KERB
acceptor MUST use the proxy-data in the message from the client to
locate the KDC and sends the encapsulated Kerberos message to that
KDC. Unless otherwise specified, the acceptor can locate the KDC per
Section 7.2.3.2 of [RFC4120].
In order to reduce the number of roundtrips between the initiator and
the acceptor, the acceptor SHOULD process any message exchange with
the KDC if the exchange is unauthenticated, such as client-referral
message exchange [REFERALS]. If the acceptor can not process the KDC
response by itself, for example when the knowledge of the client keys
is required, it sends back to the client the KDC reply message
encapsulated in a WS_KRB_PROXY message. The acceptor MUST fill out
the realm name whose KDC produced the response. The acceptor SHOULD
use the kdc-referrals option described in Section 6.5.2 of [KRB-PAFW]
to allow the KDC of the client's realm to obtain a service ticket
addressed to the acceptor, thus further reduce the number of
roundtrips between the GSS-API initiator and the GSS-API acceptor.
The GSS-API acceptor can send opaque data in the cookie field of the
WS-KRB-HEADER structure in the reply from the acceptor to the
initiator, in order to, for example, to facilitate state managements
on the GSS-API acceptor. The content and the encoding of the cookie
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field is a local matter of the acceptor. The initiator MUST copy the
verbatim cookie from the previous acceptor response, when the cookie
is present, whenever it sends an additional WS-KRB-PROXY message to
the acceptor. The client processes the KDC response, and fills out
the realm name it believes to whom the acceptor should send the
encapsulated Kerberos message.
When the client obtains a service ticket, the initiator then sends a
KRB_AP_REQ message to the acceptor, and proceed as defined in
[RFC4121]. A GSS-API authenticator extension [GSS-EXTS] MUST be sent
by the initiator. The extension type is 2 and the content is the
ASN.1 DER encoding of the type Checksum. The checksum is performed
over all GSS-API messages as exchanged between the initiator and the
acceptor before the KRB_AP_REQ message, and in the order of the
exchange. The checksum type is the required checksum type for the
enctype of the subkey in the authenticator, the protocol key is the
authenticator subkey, and the key usage number is TBA-1. The
acceptor MUST verify this checksum in the GSS-API authenticator
extension, then respond with an AP-REP extension [GSS-EXTS]. The AP-
REP extension type is 2 and the the content is the ASN.1 DER encoding
of the type Checksum. This checksum is performed over all GSS-API
messages as exchanged between the initiator and the acceptor before
the KRB_AP_REQ message, and in the order of the exchange. The
checksum type is the required checksum type for the enctype of the
authenticator subkey in the request, and the protocol key is the
authenticator subkey, and the key usage number is TBA-2. The
initiator MUST then verify this checksum.
4. Addresses in Tickets
In WS-KERB, the machine sending requests to the KDC is the GSS-API
acceptor and not the initiator. As a result, the initiator should
not include its addresses in any KDC requests for two reasons.
First, the KDC may reject the forwarded request as being from the
wrong client. Second, in the case of initial authentication for a
dial-up client, the client machine may not yet possess a network
address. Hence, as allowed by [RFC4120], the addresses field of the
AS-REQ and TGS-REQ requests SHOULD be blank and the caddr field of
the ticket SHOULD similarly be left blank.
5. Security Considerations
Similar to other network access protocols, WS-KERB allows an
unauthenticated client (possibly outside the security perimeter of an
organization) to send messages that are proxied to interior servers.
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In a scenario where DNS SRV RR's are being used to locate the KDC,
WS-KERB is being used, and an external attacker can modify DNS
responses to the WS-KERB proxy, there are several countermeasures to
prevent arbitrary messages from being sent to internal servers:
1. KDC port numbers can be statically configured on the WS-KERB
proxy. In this case, the messages will always be sent to KDC's.
For an organization that runs KDC's on a static port (usually
port 88) and does not run any other servers on the same port,
this countermeasure would be easy to administer and should be
effective.
2. The proxy can do application level sanity checking and filtering.
This countermeasure should eliminate many of the above attacks.
3. DNS security can be deployed. This countermeasure is probably
overkill for this particular problem, but if an organization has
already deployed DNS security for other reasons, then it might
make sense to leverage it here. Note that Kerberos could be used
to protect the DNS exchanges. The initial DNS SRV KDC lookup by
the proxy will be unprotected, but an attack here is at most a
denial of service (the initial lookup will be for the proxy's KDC
to facilitate Kerberos protection of subsequent DNS exchanges
between itself and the DNS server).
6. Acknowledgements
The acceptor-proxy idea is based on the early revisions of this
document written by Jonathan Trostle, Michael Swift, Bernard Aboba
and Glen Zorn.
The rest of the ideas mostly came from hallway conversations between
the author and Nicolas Williams.
7. IANA Considerations
There is no IANA action required for this document.
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
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[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
July 2005.
[RFC4178] Zhu, L., Leach, P., Jaganathan, K., and W. Ingersoll, "The
Simple and Protected Generic Security Service Application
Program Interface (GSS-API) Negotiation Mechanism",
RFC 4178, October 2005.
[KRB-ANON] Zhu, L., Leach, P. and Jaganathan, K., "Kerberos Anonymity
Support", draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon, work in progress.
[KRB-PAFW] Zhu, etl, "Kerberos Pre-Authentication framework",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework, work in progress.
[GSS-EXTS] Emery, S., draft-ietf-krb-wg-gss-cb-hash-agility, work in
progess.
[REFERALS] Raeburn, K., "Generating KDC Referrals to Locate Kerberos
Realms", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals, work in
progress.
[X680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002,
Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
[X690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER).
Author's Address
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Email: lzhu@microsoft.com
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