draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt [plain text]
NETWORK WORKING GROUP K. Raeburn
Internet-Draft MIT
Updates: 4120 (if approved) L. Zhu
Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation
Expires: January 15, 2009 July 14, 2008
Kerberos Principal Name Canonicalization and KDC-Generated Cross-Realm
Referrals
draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2009.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
The memo documents a method for a Kerberos Key Distribution Center
(KDC) to respond to client requests for Kerberos tickets when the
client does not have detailed configuration information on the realms
of users or services. The KDC will handle requests for principals in
other realms by returning either a referral error or a cross-realm
TGT to another realm on the referral path. The clients will use this
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
referral information to reach the realm of the target principal and
then receive the ticket.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Requesting a Referral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Realm Organization Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Enterprise Principal Name Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Name Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Client Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Server Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Cross Realm Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Caching Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. Number Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14.1. Shared-password case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
14.2. Preauthentication data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Compatibility with Earlier Implementations of
Name Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document history [REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION] . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
1. Introduction
Current implementations of the Kerberos AS and TGS protocols, as
defined in [RFC4120], use principal names constructed from a known
user or service name and realm. A service name is typically
constructed from a name of the service and the DNS host name of the
computer that is providing the service. Many existing deployments of
Kerberos use a single Kerberos realm where all users and services
would be using the same realm. However in an environment where there
are multiple trusted Kerberos realms, the client needs to be able to
determine what realm a particular user or service is in before making
an AS or TGS request. Traditionally this requires client
configuration to make this possible.
When having to deal with multiple trusted realms, users are forced to
know what realm they are in before they can obtain a ticket granting
ticket (TGT) with an AS request. However, in many cases the user
would like to use a more familiar name that is not directly related
to the realm of their Kerberos principal name. A good example of
this is an RFC 822 style email name. This document describes a
mechanism that would allow a user to specify a user principal name
that is an alias for the user's Kerberos principal name. In practice
this would be the name that the user specifies to obtain a TGT from a
Kerberos KDC. The user principal name no longer has a direct
relationship with the Kerberos principal or realm. Thus the
administrator is able to move the user's principal to other realms
without the user having to know that it happened.
Once a user has a TGT, they would like to be able to access services
in any trusted Kerberos realm. To do this requires that the client
be able to determine what realm the target service principal is in
before making the TGS request. Current implementations of Kerberos
typically have a table that maps DNS host names to corresponding
Kerberos realms. The user-supplied host name or its domain component
is looked up in this table (often using the result of some form of
host name lookup performed with insecure DNS queries, in violation of
[RFC4120]). The corresponding realm is then used to complete the
target service principal name.
This traditional mechanism requires that each client have very
detailed configuration information about the hosts that are providing
services and their corresponding realms. Having client side
configuration information can be very costly from an administration
point of view - especially if there are many realms and computers in
the environment.
There are also cases where specific DNS aliases (local names) have
been setup in an organization to refer to a server in another
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
organization (remote server). The server has different DNS names in
each organization and each organization has a Kerberos realm that is
configured to service DNS names within that organization. Ideally
users are able to authenticate to the server in the other
organization using the local server name. This would mean that the
local realm be able to produce a ticket to the remote server under
its name. The administrator in the local realm could give that
remote server an identity in the local realm and then have that
remote server maintain a separate secret for each alias it is known
as. Alternatively the administrator could arrange to have the local
realm issue a referral to the remote realm and notify the requesting
client of the server's remote name that should be used in order to
request a ticket.
This memo proposes a solution for these problems and simplifies
administration by minimizing the configuration information needed on
each computer using Kerberos. Specifically it describes a mechanism
to allow the KDC to handle canonicalization of names, provide for
principal aliases for users and services and allow the KDC to
determine the trusted realm authentication path by being able to
generate referrals to other realms in order to locate principals.
Two kinds of KDC referrals are introduced in this memo:
1. Client referrals, in which the client doesn't know which realm
contains a user account.
2. Server referrals, in which the client doesn't know which realm
contains a server account.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Requesting a Referral
In order to request referrals as defined in later sections, the
Kerberos client MUST explicitly request the canonicalize KDC option
(bit 15) [RFC4120] for the AS-REQ or TGS-REQ. This flag indicates to
the KDC that the client is prepared to receive a reply that contains
a principal name other than the one requested.
KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- canonicalize (15)
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
-- other KDCOptions values omitted
The client should expect, when sending names with the "canonicalize"
KDC option, that names in the KDC's reply MAY be different than the
name in the request. A referral TGT is a cross realm TGT that is
returned with the server name of the ticket being different from the
server name in the request [RFC4120].
4. Realm Organization Model
This memo assumes that the world of principals is arranged on
multiple levels: the realm, the enterprise, and the world. A KDC may
issue tickets for any principal in its realm or cross-realm tickets
for realms with which it has a direct trust relationship. The KDC
also has access to a trusted name service that can resolve any name
from within its enterprise into a realm. This trusted name service
removes the need to use an un-trusted DNS lookup for name resolution.
For example, consider the following configuration, where lines
indicate trust relationships:
EXAMPLE.COM
/ \
/ \
ADMIN.EXAMPLE.COM DEV.EXAMPLE.COM
In this configuration, all users in the EXAMPLE.COM enterprise could
have principal names such as alice@EXAMPLE.COM, with the same realm
portion. In addition, servers at EXAMPLE.COM should be able to have
DNS host names from any DNS domain independent of what Kerberos realm
their principals reside in.
5. Enterprise Principal Name Type
The NT-ENTERPRISE type principal name contains one component, a
string of realm-defined content, which is intended to be used as an
alias for another principal name in some realm in the enterprise. It
is used for conveying the alias name, not for the real principal
names within the realms, and thus is only useful when name
canonicalization is requested.
The intent is to allow unification of email and security principal
names. For example, all users at EXAMPLE.COM may have a client
principal name of the form "joe@EXAMPLE.COM" even though the
principals are contained in multiple realms. This global name is
again an alias for the true client principal name, which indicates
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
what realm contains the principal. Thus, accounts "alice" in the
realm DEV.EXAMPLE.COM and "bob" in ADMIN.EXAMPLE.COM may log on as
"alice@EXAMPLE.COM" and "bob@EXAMPLE.COM".
This utilizes a new principal name type, as the KDC-REQ message only
contains a single client realm field, and the realm portion of this
name corresponds to the Kerberos realm with which the request is
made. Thus, the entire name "alice@EXAMPLE.COM" is transmitted as a
single component in the client name field of the AS-REQ message, with
a name type of NT-ENTERPRISE [RFC4120] (and the local realm name).
The KDC will recognize this name type and then transform the
requested name into the true principal name if the client account
resides in the local realm. The true principal name can have a name
type different from the requested name type. Typically the true
principal name will be a NT-PRINCIPAL [RFC4120].
6. Name Canonicalization
A service or account may have multiple principal names. For example,
if a host is known by multiple names, host-based services on it may
be known by multiple names in order to prevent the client from
needing a secure directory service to determine the correct hostname
to use. In order that the host should not need to be updated
whenever a new alias is created, the KDC may provide the mapping
information to the client in the credential acquisition process.
If the "canonicalize" KDC option is set, then the KDC MAY change the
client and server principal names and types in the AS response and
ticket returned from the name type of the client name in the request.
In a TGS exchange, the server principal name and type may be changed.
If the client principal name is changed in an AS exchange, the KDC
must include a mandatory PA-DATA object authenticating the client
name mapping:
ClientReferralInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
requested-name [0] PrincipalName,
mapped-name [1] PrincipalName,
...
}
PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED ::= SEQUENCE {
names [0] ClientReferralInfo,
canon-checksum [1] Checksum
}
The canon-checksum field is computed over the DER encoding of the
names sequences, using the AS reply key and a key usage value of
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
(TBD).
If the client name is unchanged, the PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED data is
not included. If the client name is changed, and the PA-CLIENT-
CANONICALIZED field does not exist, or the checksum cannot be
verified, or the requested-name field doesn't match the client name
in the originally-transmitted request, the client should discard the
response.
For example the AS request may specify a client name of "bob@
EXAMPLE.COM" as an NT-ENTERPRISE name with the "canonicalize" KDC
option set and the KDC will return with a client name of "104567" as
a NT-UID, and a PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED field listing the NT-
ENTERPRISE "bob@EXAMPLE.COM" principal as the requested-name and the
NT-UID "104567" principal as the mapped-name.
(It is assumed that the client discovers whether the KDC supports the
NT-ENTERPRISE name type via out of band mechanisms.)
If the server name is changed, a PA-SERVER-REFERRAL preauth data
entry MUST be supplied by the KDC and validated by the client.
In order to enable one party in a user-to-user exchange to confirm
the identity of another when only the alias is known, the KDC MAY
include the following authorization data element, wrapped in AD-KDC-
ISSUED, in the initial credentials and copy it from a ticket-granting
ticket into additional credentials:
AD-LOGIN-ALIAS ::= SEQUENCE { -- ad-type number TBD --
login-aliases [0] SEQUENCE(1..MAX) OF PrincipalName,
}
The login-aliases field lists one or more of the aliases the
principal may have.
The recipient of this authenticator must check the AD-LOGIN-ALIAS
names, if present, in addition to the normal client name field,
against the identity of the party with which it wishes to
authenticate; either should be allowed to match. (Note that this is
not backwards compatible with [RFC4120]; if the server side of the
user-to-user exchange does not support this extension, and does not
know the true principal name, authentication may fail if the alias is
sought in the client name field.)
The use of AD-KDC-ISSUED authorization data elements in cross-realm
cases has not been well explored at this writing; hence we will only
specify the inclusion of this data in the one-realm case. The alias
information SHOULD be dropped in the general cross-realm case.
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
However, a realm MAY implement a policy of accepting and re-signing
(wrapping in a new AD-KDC-ISSUED element) alias information provided
by certain trusted realms, in the cross-realm ticket-granting
service.
The canonical principal name for an alias may not be in the form of a
ticket-granting service name, as (in a case of server name
canonicalization) that would be construed as a case of cross-realm
referral, described below.
7. Client Referrals
The simplest form of ticket referral is for a user requesting a
ticket using an AS-REQ. In this case, the client machine will send
the AS-REQ to a convenient trusted realm, for example the realm of
the client machine. In the case of the name alice@EXAMPLE.COM, the
client MAY optimistically choose to send the request to EXAMPLE.COM.
The realm in the AS-REQ is always the name of the realm that the
request is for as specified in [RFC4120].
The KDC will try to lookup the name in its local account database.
If the account is present in the realm of the request, it SHOULD
return a KDC reply structure with the appropriate ticket.
If the account is not present in the realm specified in the request
and the "canonicalize" KDC option is set, the KDC may look up the
client principal name using some kind of name service or directory
service. If this lookup is unsuccessful, it MUST return the error
KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN [RFC4120]. If the lookup is successful,
it MUST return an error KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM [RFC4120] and in the
error message the crealm field will contain either the true realm of
the client or another realm that MAY have better information about
the client's true realm. The client SHALL NOT use the cname returned
in this error message.
If the client receives a KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error, it will issue a
new AS request with the same client principal name used to generate
the first referral to the realm specified by the realm field of the
Kerberos error message corresponding to the first request. (The
client realm name will be updated in the new request to refer to this
new realm.) The client SHOULD repeat these steps until it finds the
true realm of the client. To avoid infinite referral loops, an
implementation should limit the number of referrals. A suggested
limit is 5 referrals before giving up.
Since the same client name is sent to the referring and referred-to
realms, both realms must recognize the same client names. In
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
particular, the referring realm cannot (usefully) define principal
name aliases that the referred-to realm will not know.
The true principal name of the client, returned in AS-REQ, can be
validated in a subsequent TGS message exchange where its value is
communicated back to the KDC via the authenticator in the PA-TGS-REQ
padata [RFC4120]. However, this requires trusting the referred-to
realm's KDCs. Clients should limit the referral mappings they will
accept to realms trusted via some local policy. Some possible
factors that might be taken into consideration for such a policy
might include:
o Any realm indicated by the local KDC, if the returned KRB-ERROR
message is protected by some additional means, for example using a
preauthentication scheme using a public key known to be associated
with the KDC, or an IPsec tunnel known to have the desired KDC as
the remote endpoint
o A list of realms configured by an administrator
o Any realm accepted by the user when explicitly prompted
There is currently no provision for changing the client name in a
client referral response, because there is no method for verifying
that a man-in-the-middle attack did not change the requested name in
the request on the way to the KDC.
8. Server Referrals
The primary difference in server referrals is that the KDC returns a
referral TGT rather than an error message as is done in the client
referrals. There needs to be a place to include in the reply
information about what realm contains the server; this is done by
returning information about the server name in the pre-authentication
data field of the KDC reply [RFC4120], as specified later in this
section.
If the "canonicalize" flag in the KDC options is set and the KDC
doesn't find the principal locally, either as a regular principal or
as an alias for another local principal, the KDC MAY return a cross-
realm ticket granting ticket to the next hop on the trust path
towards a realm that may be able to resolve the principal name. The
true principal name of the server SHALL be returned in the padata of
the reply if it is different from what is specified the request.
When a referral TGT is returned, the KDC MUST return the target realm
for the referral TGT as an KDC supplied pre-authentication data
element in the response. This referral information in pre-
authentication data MUST be encrypted using the session key from the
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
reply ticket. The key usage value for the encryption operation used
by PA-SERVER-REFERRAL is 26.
The pre-authentication data returned by the KDC, which contains the
referred realm and the true principal name of server, is encoded in
DER as follows.
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL 25
SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA ::= EncryptedData
-- ServerReferralData
-- returned session key, ku=26
ServerReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-realm [0] Realm OPTIONAL,
-- target realm of the referral TGT
true-principal-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
-- true server principal name
requested-principal-name [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
-- requested server name
referral-valid-until [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
rep-cksum [4] Checksum,
-- associated {AS,TGS}-REP with no padata
-- reply key, ku=[TBD]
...
}
The rep-cksum field is a checksum computed over the DER encoding of
the AS-REP or TGS-REP message with which the SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA is
included, but with the padata field omitted. It SHOULD be computed
using the mandatory-to-implement checksum type associated with the
encryption type of the reply key. (Encrypting the referral data in
with the reply key but without the checksum only proves that it was
generated by one of the parties with access to the reply key; it is
not proof against cut-and-paste attacks combining parts of different
KDC replies using the same reply key.)
Clients SHALL NOT accept a reply ticket in which the server principal
name is different from that of the request, if the KDC response does
not contain a PA-SERVER-REFERRAL padata entry.
The requested-principal-name MUST be included by the KDC, and MUST be
verified by the client, if the client sent an AS-REQ, as protection
against a man-in-the-middle modification to the AS-REQ message.
The referred-realm field is present if and only if the returned
ticket is a referral TGT, not a service ticket for the requested
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
server principal.
When a referral TGT is returned and the true-principal-name field is
present, the client MUST use that name in the subsequent requests to
the server realm when following the referral.
Client SHALL NOT accept a true server principal name for a service
ticket if the true-principal-name field is not present in the PA-
SERVER-REFERRAL data.
The client will use this referral information to request a chain of
cross-realm ticket granting tickets until it reaches the realm of the
server, and can then expect to receive a valid service ticket.
However an implementation should limit the number of referrals that
it processes to avoid infinite referral loops. A suggested limit is
5 referrals before giving up.
The client may cache the mapping of the requested name to the name of
the next realm to use and the principal name to ask for. (See
Section 10.) The referral-valid-until field, if present, conveys how
long this information is valid for.
Here is an example of a client requesting a service ticket for a
service in realm DEV.EXAMPLE.COM where the client is in
ADMIN.EXAMPLE.COM.
+NC = Canonicalize KDCOption set
+PA-REFERRAL = returned PA-SERVER-REFERRAL
C: TGS-REQ sname=http/foo.dev.example.com +NC to ADMIN.EXAMPLE.COM
S: TGS-REP sname=krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ADMIN.EXAMPLE.COM +PA-REFERRAL
containing EXAMPLE.COM as the referred realm with no
true-principal-name
C: TGS-REQ sname=http/foo.dev.example.com +NC to EXAMPLE.COM
S: TGS-REP sname=krbtgt/DEV.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM +PA-REFERRAL
containing DEV.EXAMPLE.COM as the referred realm with no
true-principal-name
C: TGS-REQ sname=http/foo.dev.example.com +NC to DEV.EXAMPLE.COM
S: TGS-REP sname=http/foo.dev.example.com@DEV.EXAMPLE.COM
Note that any referral or alias processing of the server name in
user-to-user authentication should use the same data as client name
canonicalization or referral. Otherwise, the name used by one user
to log in may not be useable by another for user-to-user
authentication to the first.
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
9. Cross Realm Routing
The current Kerberos protocol requires the client to explicitly
request a cross-realm TGT for each pair of realms on a referral
chain. As a result, the client need to be aware of the trust
hierarchy and of any short-cut trusts (those that aren't parent-
child trusts).
Instead, using the server referral routing mechanism as defined in
Section 8, The KDC will determine the best path for the client and
return a cross-realm TGT as the referral TGT, and the target realm
for this TGT in the PA-SERVER-REFERRAL of the KDC reply.
If the "canonicalize" KDC option is not set, the KDC SHALL NOT return
a referral TGT. Clients SHALL NOT process referral TGTs if the KDC
response does not contain the PA-SERVER-REFERRAL padata.
10. Caching Information
It is possible that the client may wish to get additional credentials
for the same service principal, perhaps with different authorization-
data restrictions or other changed attributes. The return of a
server referral from a KDC can be taken as an indication that the
requested principal does not currently exist in the local realm.
Clearly, it would reduce network traffic if the clients could cache
that information and use it when acquiring the second set of
credentials for a service, rather than always having to re-check with
the local KDC to see if the name has been created locally.
If the referral-valid-until field is provided in the PA-SERVER-
REFERRAL-DATA message, it indicates the expiration time of this data;
if it is not included, the expiration time of the TGT is used. When
the TGT expires, the previously returned referral from the local KDC
should be considered invalid, and the local KDC must be asked again
for information for the desired service principal name. (Note that
the client may get back multiple referral TGTs from the local KDC to
the same remote realm, with different lifetimes. The lifetime
information must be properly associated with the requested service
principal names. Simply having another TGT for the same remote realm
does not extend the validity of previously acquired information about
one service principal name.) If the client is still in contact with
the service and needs to reauthenticate to the same service
regardless of local service principal name assignments, it should use
the referred-realm and true-principal-name values when requesting new
credentials.
Accordingly, KDC authors and maintainers should consider what factors
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
(e.g., DNS alias lifetimes) they may or may not wish to incorporate
into credential expiration times in cases of referrals.
11. Open Issues
Client referral info validation
When should client name aliases be included in credentials? Should
all known client name aliases be included, or only the one used at
initial ticket acquisition?
Should list the policies that need to be defined.
More examples: u2u, policy checks, maybe cross-realm.
Possibly generalize the integrity/privacy protection on
ServerReferralData into a general padata wrapper?
Is PA-SERVER-REFERRAL needed in a TGS exchange?
Do we need to send requested-name fields, or can we just include them
in checksums?
12. Number Assignments
Most number registries in the Kerberos protocol have not been turned
over to IANA for management at the time of this writing, hence this
is not an "IANA Considerations" section.
Various values do need assigning for this draft:
AD-LOGIN-ALIAS
PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED
key usage value for PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED field canon-checksum
13. IANA Considerations
None at present.
14. Security Considerations
For the AS exchange case, it is important that the logon mechanism
not trust a name that has not been used to authenticate the user.
For example, the name that the user enters as part of a logon
exchange may not be the name that the user authenticates as, given
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
that the KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error may have been returned. The
relevant Kerberos naming information for logon (if any), is the
client name and client realm in the service ticket targeted at the
workstation that was obtained using the user's initial TGT.
How the client name and client realm is mapped into a local account
for logon is a local matter, but the client logon mechanism MUST use
additional information such as the client realm and/or authorization
attributes from the service ticket presented to the workstation by
the user, when mapping the logon credentials to a local account on
the workstation.
14.1. Shared-password case
A special case to examine is when the user is known (or correctly
suspected) to use the same password for multiple accounts. A man-in-
the-middle attacker can either alter the request on its way to the
KDC, changing the client principal name, or reply to the client with
a response previously send by the KDC in response to a request from
the attacker. The response received by the client can then be
decrypted by the user, though if the default "salt" generated from
the principal name is used to produce the user's key, a PA-ETYPE-INFO
or PA-ETYPE-INFO2 preauth record may need to be added or altered by
the attacker to cause the client software to generate the key needed
for the message it will receive. None of this requires the attacker
to know the user's password, and without further checking, could
cause the user to unknowingly use the wrong credentials.
In normal [RFC4120] operation, a generated AP-REQ message includes in
the Authenticator field a copy of the client's idea of its own
principal name. If this differs from the name in the KDC-generated
Ticket, the application server will reject the message.
With client name canonicalization as described in this document, the
client may get its principal name from the response from the KDC.
Requiring the PA-CLIENT-CANONICALIZED data lets the client securely
check that the requested name was not altered in transit. If the PA-
CLIENT-CANONICALIZED data is absent, the client can use the principal
name it requested.
14.2. Preauthentication data
In cases of credential renewal, forwarding, or validation, if
credentials are sent to the KDC that are not an initial ticket-
granting ticket for the client's home realm, the encryption key used
to protect the TGS exchange is one known to a third party (namely,
the service for which the credential was issued). Consequently, in
such an exchange, the protection described earlier for the
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
preauthentication data cannot be assumed to provide a secure channel
between the KDC and the client, and such preauth data MUST NOT be
trusted for any information that needs to come from the KDC.
15. Acknowledgments
Sam Hartman and authors came up with the idea of using the ticket key
to encrypt the referral data, which prevents cut and paste attack
using the referral data and referral TGTs.
John Brezak, Mike Swift, and Jonathan Trostle wrote the initial
version of this document.
Karthik Jaganathan contributed to earlier versions.
16. References
16.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
16.2. Informative References
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC4556] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.
[XPR] Trostle, J., Kosinovsky, I., and M. Swift, "Implementation
of Crossrealm Referral Handling in the MIT Kerberos
Client", Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, February 2001.
Appendix A. Compatibility with Earlier Implementations of Name
Canonicalization
The Microsoft Windows 2000 and Windows 2003 releases included an
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
earlier form of name-canonicalization [XPR]. Here are the
differences:
1) The TGS referral data is returned inside of the KDC message as
"encrypted pre-authentication data".
EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
key [0] EncryptionKey,
last-req [1] LastReq,
nonce [2] UInt32,
key-expiration [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
flags [4] TicketFlags,
authtime [5] KerberosTime,
starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime [7] KerberosTime,
renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm [9] Realm,
sname [10] PrincipalName,
caddr [11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
encrypted-pa-data [12] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL
}
2) The preauth data type definition in the encrypted preauth data is
as follows:
PA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO 20
PA-SVR-REFERRAL-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
referred-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
referred-realm [0] Realm
}}
3) When PKINIT ([RFC4556]) is used, the NT-ENTERPRISE client name is
encoded as a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension [RFC3280] in
the client's X.509 certificate. The type of the otherName field
for this SAN extension is AnotherName [RFC3280]. The type-id
field of the type AnotherName is id-ms-sc-logon-upn
(1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3) and the value field of the type
AnotherName is a KerberosString [RFC4120]. The value of this
KerberosString type is the single component in the name-string
[RFC4120] sequence for the corresponding NT-ENTERPRISE name type.
In Microsoft's current implementation through the use of global
catalogs any domain in one forest is reachable from any other domain
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
in the same forest or another trusted forest with 3 or less
referrals. A forest is a collection of realms with hierarchical
trust relationships: there can be multiple trust trees in a forest;
each child and parent realm pair and each root realm pair have
bidirectional transitive direct rusts between them.
While we might want to permit multiple aliases to exist and even be
reported in AD-LOGIN-ALIAS, the Microsoft implementation permits only
one NT-ENTERPRISE alias to exist, so this question had not previously
arisen.
Appendix B. Document history [REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION]
11 Changed title. Better protection on server referral preauth data.
Support server name canonicalization. Rename ReferralInfo to
ClientReferralInfo. Disallow alias mapping to a TGT principal.
Explain why no name change in client referrals. Add empty IANA
Considerations. Add some notes on preauth data protection during
renewal etc.
10 Separate enterprise principal names into a separate section. Add
a little wording to suggest server principal name canonicalization
might be allowed; not fleshed out. Advise against AD-KDC-ISSUED
in cronn-realm cases. Advise policy checks on returned client
referral info, since there's no security. List number
assignments. Add security analysis of shared-password case. No
longer plan to remove Microsoft appendix. Add referral-valid-
until field.
09 Changed to EXAMPLE.COM instead of using Morgan Stanley's domain.
Rewrote description of existing practice. (Don't name the lookup
table consulted. Mention that DNS "canonicalization" is contrary
to [RFC4120].) Noted Microsoft behavior should be moved out into
a separate document. Changed some second-person references in the
introduction to identify the proper parties. Changed PA-CLIENT-
CANONICALIZED to use a separate type for the actual referral data,
add an extension marker to that type, and change the checksum key
from the "returned session key" to the "AS reply key". Changed
AD-LOGIN-ALIAS to contain a sequence of names, to be contained in
AD-KDC-ISSUED instead of AD-IF-RELEVANT, and to drop the no longer
needed separate checksum. Attempt to clarify the cache lifetime
of referral information.
08 Moved Microsoft implementation info to appendix. Clarify lack of
local server name canonicalization. Added optional authz-data for
login alias, to support user-to-user case. Added requested-
principal-name to ServerReferralData. Added discussion of caching
information, and referral TGT lifetime.
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
07 Re-issued with new editor. Fixed up some references. Started
history.
Authors' Addresses
Kenneth Raeburn
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
US
Email: raeburn@mit.edu
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Email: lzhu@microsoft.com
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft KDC Referrals July 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Raeburn & Zhu Expires January 15, 2009 [Page 19]