draft-swift-win2k-krb-user2user-02.txt [plain text]
Kerberos Working Group M. Swift
Internet Draft University of WA
Document: draft-swift-win2k-krb-user2user-02.txt J. Brezak
Category: Informational Microsoft
P. Moore
Sandia National Labs
April 2001
User to User Kerberos Authentication using GSS-API
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1].
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1. Abstract
This draft documents a simple extension to the Kerberos GSS-API
mechanism to support user to user authentication both in the case
where the client application explicitly requests user to user
authentication and when it does not know whether the server supports
user to user authentication.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2].
3. Introduction
The Kerberos user to user authentication mechanism allows for a
client application to connect to a service that is not in possession
of a long term secret key. Instead, the session ticket from the
KERB-AP-REQ is encrypted using the session key from the service's
ticket granting ticket. According to RFC 1510 [3]:
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If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an
additional ticket has been included in the request, the KDC
will decrypt the additional ticket using the key for the server
to which the additional ticket was issued and verify that it is
a ticket-granting ticket. If the request succeeds, the session
key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new
ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server
for which the new ticket will be used (This allows easy
implementation of user-to-user authentication, which uses
ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server
keys in situations where such secret keys could be easily
compromised).
RFC2078 [5], in section 5.2, discusses a "Double-TGT K-5" mechanism
and scenario, but not in the detail required in order to implement
the mechanism. The RFC for the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism at the
time this draft was prepared, RFC 1964 [4] does not support user-to-
user authentication.
This draft provides details as to mechanism type, token identifiers,
messages and message types sufficient to document an implementation
of user-to-user authentication in Kerberos GSS-API. It follows the
scenario described in RFC2078.
The approach documented in this draft has been used to support user-
to-user authentication in the Microsoft Windows 2000 SSPI with the
Kerberos V5 protocol, and in a patched Kerberos V5 implementation
being used to support a computing grid at Sandia, Lawrence
Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories.
4. User to User as a New Mechanism
A new mechanism OID may be used to establish a user-to-user session:
{iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554)
infosys(1) gssapi(2) krb5(2) usertouser(3)}
In the case that the client application knows that the server
requires user-to-user authentication, then the initial call to
GSS_Init_Sec_Context will request this mechanism. This new mechanism
is used with a token exchange that extends the conventional Kerberos
GSS-API protocol by adding an additional round trip to request the
TGT from the service. As with all Kerberos GSS-API messages, the
following tokens are encapsulated in the GSS-API framing. The first
token of the exchange will have an innerContextToken with a 2-octet
TOK_ID field containing 04 00 (KERB-TGT-REQUEST) followed by a
Kerberos V5 message as follows:
KERB-TGT-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
server-name[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
realm[3] Realm OPTIONAL
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}
The TGT request consists of four fields:
pvno and msg-type are as defined in RFC1510 section 5.4.1. msg-
type is KRB_TGT_REQ (16).
server-name : this field optionally contains the name of the
server. If the client application doesn't know the
server name this can be left blank and the server
application will pick the appropriate server
credentials which may be the default credential.
realm : this field optionally contains the realm of the server.
If the client application doesn't know the server realm
this field can be left blank and the server application
will pick the appropriate server credentials which may
be the server's default realm.
The server name and realm are included to allow a server application
to act for multiple principles in different realms and to choose
which credentials to use.
The response to the KERB-TGT-REQUEST message will be a
KERB_TGT_REPLY token which will have an innerContextToken with a 2-
octet TOK_ID field containing 04 01 (KERB-TGT-REPLY) followed by a
Kerberos V5 message as follows:
KERB-TGT-REPLY ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
ticket[2] Ticket
}
The TGT reply contains the following fields:
pvno and msg-type are as defined in RFC1510 section 5.4.1. msg-
type is KRB_TGT_REP (17)
ticket : contains the TGT for the service specified by the
server name and realm passed by the client or the
default service.
If the service does not possess a ticket granting ticket, it should
return the error KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT (0x43).
If the server name and realm in the KERB-TGT-REQUEST message do not
match the name of the service, then the service should return the
error KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US.
Following the exchange of the TGT request messages, the initiator
requests a ticket to the service from the KDC using a KERB-TGS-REQ
with the KDCoption ENC-TKT-IN_SKEY and the second ticket in the
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additional-tickets of the KDC-REQ-BODY. Upon receipt of the TGS-REP
the rest of the authentication identical to the Kerberos GSS-API
mechanism defined in RFC 1964 [4].
5. User-to-User when applied via KDC policy
Implementations MAY support the ability apply a policy on a user
account such that the KDC will not allow conventional service ticket
requests, and when presented with a KERB_TGS_REQ that does not
contain a second ticket with an ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY KDCoption will
respond with a KRB-ERROR with the msg-type
KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER (or KRB5PLACEHOLD_27).
In this case, the client need not explicitly request user-to-user in
order to get a user-to-user connection. Implementations may use this
error code to set a flag and return a GSS_C_CONTINUE_NEEDED so that
the next round uses the mechanism described in section 4.
6. User to User when applied by server policy
In the case that the client application doesn't know that a service
requires user-to-user authentication, and requests and receives a
conventional KRB_AP_REP, the client will send the KRB_AP_REP
request, and the server will respond with a KRB_ERROR token as
described in RFC1964, with a msg-type of
KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED (0x45). The server may optionally
pass the TGT in the data field of this error message. In response to
this error, the initiator sets flags and returns a
GSS_C_CONTINUE_NEEDED so that the next round uses the mechanism
described in section 4.
7. Security Considerations
These extensions simply enable an existing Kerberos 5 authentication
protocol so that it may be used from GSSAPI.
There is some risk in a server handing out its ticket-granting-
ticket to any client that requests it, in that it gives an attacker
a piece of encrypted material to decrypt. However, the same material
may be obtained from listening to any legitimate client connection.
It should be noted here that the exchange described in section 6
requires that the KDC provide tickets for user accounts, which will
contain known plaintext encrypted in the usersĘ private key. The
risk associated with this is entirely mitigated where a KDC supports
the KDC_MUST_USE_USER2USER feature, which allows a restriction on
user accounts to ensure that all tickets for that account are
encrypted in the TGT session key, and not the long term key of the
user.
8. References
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1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
3 J. Kohl, C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service(V5)", RFC 1510.
4 J. Linn, "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC 1964
5 J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface,
Version 2", RFC 2078
9. Author's Addresses
Michael Swift
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu
John Brezak
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington
Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com
Patrick Moore
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800 Mail Stop
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Email: pcmoore@sandia.gov
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