miscd.c   [plain text]

  * Front end to the ULTRIX miscd service. The front end logs the remote host
  * name and then invokes the real miscd daemon. Install as "/usr/etc/miscd",
  * after renaming the real miscd daemon to the name defined with the
  * REAL_MISCD macro.
  * Connections and diagnostics are logged through syslog(3).
  * The Ultrix miscd program implements (among others) the systat service, which
  * pipes the output from who(1) to stdout. This information is potentially
  * useful to systems crackers.
  * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.

#ifndef lint
static char sccsid[] = "@(#) miscd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:30";

/* System libraries. */

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <syslog.h>


#define STDIN_FILENO	0

/* Local stuff. */

#include "patchlevel.h"
#include "tcpd.h"

int     allow_severity = SEVERITY;	/* run-time adjustable */
int     deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;	/* ditto */

main(argc, argv)
int     argc;
char  **argv;
    struct request_info request;
    char    path[MAXPATHNAMELEN];

    /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */


     * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog()
     * require only two arguments.

#ifdef LOG_MAIL
    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY);
    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID);

     * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name
     * lookups and double checks will be done on demand.

    request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0);

     * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites
     * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts
     * that pretend to have someone elses host name.

    if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid))

     * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow
     * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason.
     * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the
     * getsockopt() system call can panic the system.


     * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The
     * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in
     * the access-control tables.

    if (!hosts_access(&request))

    /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */

    syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request));
    sprintf(path, "%s/miscd", REAL_DAEMON_DIR);
    (void) execv(path, argv);
    syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path);
    /* NOTREACHED */