codesign.1   [plain text]

.Dd June 1, 2006
.Nm codesign
.Nd Create and manipulate code signatures
.\" sign code (-s)
.Ar -s identity
.Op -i identifier
.Op -r requirements
.Op Fl fv
.Op Ar path ...
.\" verify code (-v)
.Ar -v
.Op -R requirement
.Op Fl v
.Op Ar path|pid ...
.\" display code signatures (-d)
.Ar -d
.Op Fl v
.Op Ar path|pid ...
.\" display hosting paths (-h)
.Ar -h
.Op Fl v
.Op Ar pid ...
command is used to create, check, and display code signatures, as well as
inquire into the dynamic status of signed code in the system.
requires exactly one
.Ar operation
option to determine what action is to be performed, as well as any number of
other options to modify its behavior. It can act on any number of objects per invocation,
but performs the same operation on all of them.
accepts single-character (classic) options, as well as GNU-style long
options of the form --name and --name=value. Common options have both
forms; less frequent and specialized options have only long form.
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width indent
.It Fl d, -display
Display information about the code at the path(s) given. Increasing levels
of verbosity produce more output.
The format is designed to be moderately easy to parse by simple scripts while still
making sense to human eyes.
In addition, the -r, --file-list, and --entitlements options can be used to retrieve additional information.
.It Fl D, -detached Ar filename
When signing, designates that a detached signature should be written to
the specified file. The code being signed is not modified and need not be
When verifying, designates a file containing a detached signature to be used
for verification. Any embedded signature in the code is ignored.
.It Fl f, -force
When signing, causes
to replace any existing signature on the path(s) given. Without this option,
existing signatures will not be replaced, and the signing operation fails.
.It Fl h, --hosting
Constructs and prints the hosting chain of a running program. The
.Ar pid
arguments must denote running code (pids etc.) With verbose options, this also
displays the individual dynamic validity status of each element of the hosting chain.
.It Fl i, -identifier Ar identifier
During signing, explicitly specify the unique identifier string that is embedded
in code signatures. If this option is omitted, the identifier is derived from
either the Info.plist (if present), or the filename of the executable being signed,
possibly modified by the --prefix option.
Note that it is a very bad idea to sign multiple programs with the same identifier.
.It Fl o, -options Ar flag,...
During signing, specifies a set of option flags to be embedded in the code
signature. The value takes the form of a comma-separated list of names (with
no spaces). Alternatively, a numeric value can be used to directly
specify the option mask (CodeDirectory flag word). See OPTION FLAGS below.
.It Fl P, -pagesize Ar pagesize
Indicates the granularity of code signing. Pagesize must be a power of two.
Chunks of pagesize bytes are separately signed and can thus be independently verified as needed.
As a special case, a pagesize of zero
indicates that the entire code should be signed and verified as a single,
possibly gigantic page. This option only applies to the main executable and has
no effect on the sealing of associated data, including resources.
.It Fl r, -requirements Ar requirements
During signing, indicates that internal requirements should be embedded in the
code path(s) as specified. See "specifying requirements" below.
Defaults will be applied to requirement types that are not explicitly specified;
if you want to defeat such a default, specify "never" for that type.
During display, indicates where to write the code's internal requirements. Use -r-
to write them to standard output.
.It Fl R, -test-requirement Ar requirement
During verification, indicates that the path(s) given should be verified against
the code requirement specified. If this option is omitted, the code is verified
only for internal integrity and against its own designated requirement.
.It Fl s, -sign Ar identity
Sign the code at the path(s) given using this identity. See SIGNING IDENTITIES below.
.It Fl v, -verbose
Sets (with a numeric value) or increments the verbosity level of output. Without
the verbose option, no output is produced upon success, in the classic UNIX style.
If no other options request a different action, the first -v encountered will be
interpreted as --verify instead (and does not increase verbosity).
.It Fl v, -verify
Requests verification of code signatures.
If other actions (sign, display, etc.) are also requested, -v is interpreted
to mean --verbose.
.It Fl -continue
to continue processing path arguments even if processing one fails.
If this option is given, exit due to operational errors is deferred until
all path arguments have been considered. The exit code will then indicate
the most severe failure (or, with equal severity, the first such failure encountered).
.It Fl -dryrun
During signing, performs almost all signing operations, but does not actually
write the result anywhere. Cryptographic signatures are still generated,
actually using the given signing identity and triggering any access control
checks normally, though the resulting signature is then discarded.
.It Fl -entitlements Ar path
When signing, take the file at the given
.Ar path
and embed its contents in the signature as entitlement data.
When displaying a signature, extract any entitlement data from the signature
and write it to the
.Ar path
given. Use "-" to write to standard output. If the signature has no entitlement data,
nothing is written (this is not an error).
.It Fl -extract-certificates Ar prefix
When displaying a signature, extract the certificates in the embedded certificate chain
and write them to individual files. The
.Ar prefix
argument is appended with numbers 0, 1, ... to form the filenames, which can be relative
or absolute. Certificate 0 is the leaf (signing) certificate, and as many files are written
as there are certificates in the signature. The files are in ASN.1 (DER) form.
.It Fl -file-list Ar path
When signing or displaying a signature,
writes to the given path a list of
files that may have been modified as part of the signing process. This is useful
for installer or patcher programs that need to know what was changed or what files
are needed to make up the "signature" of a program. The file given is appended-to,
with one line per absolute path written. An argument of "-" (single dash) denotes standard
Note that the list may be
somewhat pessimistic - all files not listed are guaranteed to be unchanged by the
signing process, but some of the listed files may not actually have changed.
Also note that changes may have been made to extended attributes of these
.It Fl -ignore-resources
During static validation, do not validate the contents of the code's resources.
In effect, this will pass validation on code whose resources have been corrupted
(or inappropriately signed). On large programs, it will also substantially speed
up static validation, since all the resources will not be read into memory.
Obviously, the outcome of such a validation should be considered on its merits.
.It Fl -keychain Ar filename
During signing, only search for the signing identity in the keychain file
specified. This can be used to break any matching ties if you have multiple
similarly-named identities in several keychains on the user's search list.
Note that the standard keychain search path is still consulted while constructing
the certificate chain being embedded in the signature.
.It Fl -prefix Ar string
If no explicit unique identifier is specified (using the -i option), and if
the implicitly generated identifier does not contain any dot (.) characters,
then the given string is prefixed to the identifier before use. If the implicit
identifier contains a dot, it is used as-is. Typically,
this is used to deal with command tools without Info.plists, whose default
identifier is simply the command's filename; the conventional prefix used
is com.domain. (note that the final dot needs to be explicit).
.It Fl -preserve-metadata
When signing code that is already signed, take the internal requirements and entitlement
data from the old signature and re-use it for the new signature. If new data is specified
with the --requirements and --entitlements options, it is taken instead, thereby allowing
selective replacement. Individual types of internal requirements cannot be overridden this way.
You still need to specify the -f (--force) option to enable overwriting signatures.
If the old signature does not contain metadata, this option has no effect.
.It Fl -resource-rules=filename
During signing, this option overrides the default rules for collecting bundle
resources to be sealed into the signature. The argument is the path to a
property list (plist) file containing resource scanning instructions.
.\" Signing
.\" =============================================================================
In the first synopsis form,
attempts to sign the code objects at the
.Ar path(s)
given, using the
.Ar identity
provided. Internal
.Ar requirements
.Ar entitlements
are embedded if requested. Internal requirements not specified may be assigned suitable
default values. Defaulting applies separately to each type of internal requirement.
If an
.Ar identifier
is explicitly given, it is sealed into all
.Ar path(s) .
Otherwise, each path derives its
.Ar identifier
independently from its Info.plist or pathname.
.Ar pagesize
can be used to control the granularity of the code hash table. Usually, only
specific sizes are acceptable to the verifying agents; this option should be used
only in special cases.
.\" Verification
.\" =============================================================================
In the second synopsis form,
verifies the code signatures on all the
.Ar path(s)
given. The verification confirms that the code at those
.Ar path(s)
is signed, that the signature is valid, and that all sealed components are
unaltered. If a
.Ar requirement
is given, each
.Ar path
is also checked against this requirement (but see DIAGNOSTICS below).
If verbose verification is requested, the program is also checked against its own
designated requirement, which should never fail for a properly signed program.
If a
.Ar path
begins with a decimal digit, it is interpreted as the process id of a running
process in the system, and dynamic validation is performed on that process instead.
This checks the code's dynamic status and just enough static data to close the
nominal security envelope. Add at least one level of verbosity to also perform
a full static check.
.\" Display/dump
.\" =============================================================================
In the third synopsis form,
displays the contents of the signatures on the
.Ar path(s)
given. More information is displayed as the verbosity level increases.
This form may not completely verify the signatures
on the
.Ar path(s) ;
though it may perform some verification steps in the process of obtaining information
about the
.Ar path(s) .
If the
.Ar -r path
option is given, internal requirements will be extracted from the
.Ar path(s)
and written to
.Ar path ;
specify a dash "-" to write to standard output. If the code does not contain
an explicit designated requirement, the implied one will be retrieved and written
out as a source comment.
If the
.Ar --entitlements path
option is given, embedded entitlement data will be extracted likewise and written to
the file specified.
.\" Hosting chain
.\" =============================================================================
In the fourth synopsis form,
constructs the hosting path for each
.Ar pid
given and writes it, one host per line, to standard output. The hosting path is the
chain of code signing hosts starting with the most specific code known to be running,
and ending with the root of trust (the kernel). If the
.Ar --verbose
option is given, the dynamic validity status of each host is also displayed, separated
from the path by a tab character.
Note that hosting chains can at times be constructed for invalid or even unsigned code,
and the output of this form of the
command should not be taken as a statement of formal code validity. Only
.Ar --verify
can do that.
To be used for code signing, a digital identity must be stored in a keychain that
is on the calling user's keychain search list. The identity is located by searching
all such keychains for a certificate whose subject contains the
.Ar identity
string given. If there are multiple matches, the invocation fails and no signing
is performed; however, a full match is preferred over a partial match.
If the --keychain argument is used, the identity is only looked-for in the
specific keychain given. Even in that case, the keychain search list is still
consulted for additional certificates needed to complete the signature.
will attempt to embed the entire certificate chain documenting the signing identity
in the code signature it generates, including any intermediate certificates and
the anchor certificate. It looks for those in the keychain search list of the user
performing the signing operation. If it cannot generate the entire certificate chain,
signing may still succeed, but verification may fail if the verifying code does not
have an independent source for the missing certificates.
All keychain sources are supported if properly configured. In particular, it is
possible to sign code with an identity stored on a supported smart card.
If your signing identity is stored in a different form, you need to import it
into a keychain to use it with this program.
.Ar requirement(s)
arguments (-r and -R) can be given in various forms. A plain text argument is taken
to be a path to a file containing the requirement(s).
will accept both binary files containing properly compiled requirements code, and source files
that are automatically compiled before use.
An argument of "-" requests that the requirement(s) are read from standard input.
Finally, an argument that begins with an equal sign "=" is taken as a literal
requirements source text, and is compiled accordingly for use.
When signing, a set of option flags can be specified to change the behavior
of the system when using the signed code. The following flags are recognized
.Nm ;
other flags may exist at the API level. Note that you can specify any valid
flags by giving a (single) numeric value instead of a list of option names.
.Bl -tag -width expires
.It kill
Forces the signed code's kill flag to be set when the code begins execution.
Code with the kill flag set will die when it loses its identity. It is therefore
safe to assume that code marked this way will have a valid identity while alive.
.It hard
Forces the signed code's hard flag to be set when the code begins execution.
The hard flag is a hint to the system that the code prefers to be denied
access to resources if gaining such access would invalidate its identity.
.It host
Marks the code as capable of hosting guest code. You must set this option
if you want the code to act as a code signing host, controlling subsidiary
("guest") code.
.It expires
Forces any validation of the code to consider expiration of the certificates
involved. Code signatures generated with this flag will fail to verify once any of
the certificates in the chain has expired, regardless of the intentions of the
verifier. Note that this flag does not affect any other checks that may cause
signature validation to fail, including checks for certificate revocation.
Note that code can set the hard and kill flags on itself at any time. The signing
options only affect their initial state. Once set by any means, these flags
cannot be cleared for the lifetime of the code. Therefore, specifying such flags
as signing options guarantees that they will be set whenever the signed code runs.
If the code being signed has an Info.plist that contains a key named CSFlags,
the value of that key is taken as the default value for the options. The value
of CSFlags can be a string in the same form as the --options option, or an
integer number specifying the absolute numeric value. Note however that while you
can abbreviate flag names on the command lines, you must spell them out in the Info.plist.
.\".Sh FILES
.\".Bl -tag -width /Library/Keychains/System.keychain -compact
.\".It Pa /Library/Keychains/System.keychain
To sign application with a signing identity named "authority":
.Dl codesign -s authority
To sign the command-line tool "helper" with the same identity, overwriting
any existing signature, using the signing identifier "com.mycorp.helper",
and embedding a custom designated requirement
.Dl codesign -f -s authority --prefix=com.mycorp. -r="designated => anchor /tmp/foo" helper
To verify the signature on and produce some verbose output:
.Dl codesign -vv
To verify the dynamic validity of process 666:
.Dl codesign -v 666
To display all information about's code signature:
.Dl codesign -dvvvv
To extract the internal requirements from to standard output:
.Dl codesign -d -r-
exits 0 if all operations succeed. This indicates that all codes were
signed, or all codes verified properly as requested. If a signing or verification
operation fails, the exit code is 1. Exit code 2 indicates invalid arguments
or parameters. Exit code 3 indicates that during verification, all path(s) were
properly signed but at least one of them failed to satisfy the requirement specified
with the
.Ar -R
For verification, all path arguments are always investigated before the program exits.
For all other operations, the program exits upon the first error encountered,
and any further path arguments are ignored, unless the --continue option was
specified, in which case
will defer the failure exit until after it has attempted to process all path
arguments in turn.
When a signing operation fails for a particular code, the code may already have been modified
in certain ways by adding requisite signature data. Such information will not
change the operation of the code, and the code will not be considered signed even with
these pieces in place. You may repeat the signing operation without difficulty.
Note however that a previous valid signature may have been effectively destroyed
if you specified the -f option.
If you require atomicity of signing stricter than provided by
, you need to make an explicit copy of your code and sign that.
.Xr csreq 1
command first appeared in Mac OS 10.5.0 (Leopard).
Some options only apply to particular operations, and the command ignores them (without complaining)
if you specify them for an operation for which they have no meaning.
has several operations and options that are purposely left undocumented in this manual page because they
are either experimental (and subject to change at any time), or unadvised to the unwary.